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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study was to establish the vulnerabilities of the security control 
measures that are being used at Impala Platinum mines and refinery to prevent the 
theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs). It is important to ensure that the security 
control measures in place are effective and efficient in preventing the occurrence of 
such theft. 
 
The research examined the security risk management approach to the prevention of 
theft of PGMs and the causes of theft of PGMs by organised crime syndicates 
operating in South Africa and abroad. 
 
The study found that Impala Platinum employees, in collusion with contractors and 
members of mine security services, are involved in the theft of PGMs.  
 
To achieve the goals and objective of the research study, effective security control 
measures were identified that will help Impala Platinum mines and refinery to 
overcome the risks and challenges related to the theft of PGMs. 
 
Key terms 
Platinum Group Metals; theft; Security Risk Management Model; security risk 
management approach; prevention; security risk control measures; analysis; incident 
reports; organised crime syndicates; protection; behaviour; organised crime threats; 
modus operandi; investigation; recovery process. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Impala Platinum mines and refinery is the second largest Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs) producer in the world after Anglo Platinum mines. The company produces 
six (6) PGMs, namely; Platinum (Pt), Palladium (Pd), Rhodium (Rh), Ruthenium 
(Ru), Gold (Au) and Iridium (Ir).  
 
This research study focused on the extent and impact of the theft of PGMs at Impala 
Platinum mines and their refinery in Rustenburg and Springs respectively in South 
Africa. It examined the security risk management approach to the prevention of theft 
of PGMs, vulnerability in security control measures, and causes of theft of PGMs by 
syndicates. The theft of PGMs material tends to occur above ground during one of 
the recovery phases in the plant. 
 
The theft of PGMs and the vulnerabilities of the security control measures have the 
potential to negatively affect the organisation’s assets. It is therefore imperative for 
the security control measures to be effectively and efficiently managed to prevent the 
theft of PGMs. 
 
The mixed methods research approach was utilised to study the security risk 
management approach to the prevention of theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum mines 
and refinery. For the purpose of this research study, explorative research design was 
utilised. Semi-structured one-on-one interviews were conducted with employees and 
contractors respectively with the purpose of collecting relevant information for this 
study. The same interview questions were used for both the employees and 
contractors. 
 
Three separate questionnaire surveys were used to conduct interviews with security 
managers, security investigators and security officers working at Impala Platinum 
mines and refinery. The purpose was to obtain information from the professionals 
since they are responsible for performing different tasks within their discipline.  
 
They are responsible for protection, prevention and investigation of theft of PGMs 
and other crimes in their field of work. The respondents were offered adequate times 
ix 
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to complete the questionnaires. Since the research study was conducted on theft of 
PGMs, case dockets were selected and perused. The purpose was to determine the 
modus operandi of organised crime syndicates that are involved in the theft of 
PGMs.  
 
The study found that there was the need for the improvement in the current security 
measures at Impala Platinum mines and refinery. Based on these findings the 
researcher made recommendations that will be helpful to the organisation in 
prevention and protection of theft of PGMs. The recommendations will also be 
helpful to other mining industry facing challenges in theft of PGMs.
x 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research study focuses on the extent and impact of the theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs) at Impala Platinum mines in the Rustenburg area of the North West 
Province in South Africa, and at the refinery in Springs on the East Rand in Gauteng. 
The primary platinum producing mines (Anglo Platinum, Impala Platinum and Lonmin 
Platinum) produce different types of PGMs. They all produce platinum as a primary 
product of their mines, but with different secondary PGMs. For the purpose of this 
study, the term PGMs will be used for the metals produced from Impala Platinum – 
since the case study is at the Impala Platinum mines and refinery. 
 
This research study aims to determine the shortcomings (gaps) and vulnerabilities in 
existing security measures at the Impala Platinum mines in the North West Province, 
and the refinery in Springs. Furthermore, it will attempt to identify the underlying 
causes and reasons for theft of PGMs. Finally, the study aims to analyse and 
formulate – based on the research findings – improved preventative measures to 
combat the theft of PGMs from Impala Platinum. 
 
The research study is on the mining industry and more specifically on Impala 
Platinum mines and the refinery. The researcher became interested in conducting 
this study as he works for Impala Platinum as Superintendent of Investigations. The 
work entails investigating crime and any breaches of security procedures. 
 
Impala Platinum is the second largest producer of PGMs in the world. The PGMs 
produced by Impala Platinum consist of six different PGM commodities: Platinum 
(Pt), Palladium (Pd), Rhodium (Rh), Ruthenium (Ru), Gold (Au), and Iridium (Ir) 
(Anon, 2013).  
 
The platinum reefs are igneous – originating from molten volcanic magmata that rose 
from below the earth’s crust and which then cooled and solidified. The precious 
metals occur in the ore in a variety of patterns and forms and are concentrated in 
different values. Unlike gold-bearing ore, which is often found in seams where there 
2 
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are significant concentrations of gold, PGMs are found in the form of minute particles 
that are generally thinly distributed in the ore. These particles are not visible to the 
naked eye and do not appear in sufficient concentrations that make it attractive for 
thieves to remove PGM bearing material from underground mining operations (Anon, 
2013). 
 
The theft of material bearing PGMs therefore tends to occur above ground during 
one of the recovery phases at the mine or refinery. Depending on the mineralogy of 
the ore, the recovery process of PGMs has to go through four complicated stages of 
refining: concentration, smelting, base metals’ removal, and precious metals’ refining 
(Anon, 2013). 
 
Theft of PGMs in South Africa is a major challenge for the Platinum mining industry, 
and it has a negative impact on the company concerned because of losses in 
revenue suffered. The theft of PGMs also has a negative impact on the government, 
since it suffers large revenue losses due to taxes and royalties not being paid by the 
syndicates involved in the criminal activities in respect of the stolen product 
(Potgieter, 2011). PGMs are in great demand in the underworld in any of its forms – 
varying from low to high grade material at national and international levels (Potgieter, 
2011). 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Impala Platinum periodically experiences theft of PGMs and the losses suffered by 
the company amount to millions of rands annually. This theft of PGMs is an 
indication that there is some involvement by company employees in this theft from 
the company. Security officers whose duties are to protect Impala assets may also 
be involved in the theft and may connive with dishonest employees inside the 
company (Anon, 2013). 
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:48), the core of any research study is the 
“research problem”. According to Welman et al (2012:14), the researcher studies the 
problem to obtain a solution for the situation that has been identified as problematic. 
In addition, Hernon and Schwartz (2007:308) believe that a problem statement 
should be specific, manageable and written to stimulate the reader interest. The 
3 
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focus in this research study is the continuous theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum 
refinery and mines. 
 
According to Gastrow (2001:1), the problem of the theft of PGMs from platinum 
mines and refinery is confined to a relatively manageable geographical area – in 
comparison with the much wider distribution of gold and diamond mines across 
South Africa. It would also appear that there is widespread involvement of a number 
of organised crime syndicates in the theft of PGMs. Organised crime syndicates 
involved in the theft of PGMs also commit other crimes such as money laundering, 
racketeering, drug trafficking, extortion, bribery, and human trafficking (Coetzee & 
Horn, 2007:82).  
 
1.3 AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Mouton (1996:50), the aims of research should illustrate what the 
researcher wishes to establish through the research. The aim of this research is to 
explore the implications to the company of the theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum 
mines and refinery in Springs, and also make recommendations for the prevention 
thereof. A further aim is to obtain new data on how theft of PGMs is committed as 
well as the root causes and to establish interesting patterns in the data in order to 
make certain recommendations that can be used to improve on the security 
measures in place (Mouton, 1996:103).  
 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Welman and Kruger (2001: 18), the purpose of this research is to 
define, explain and consequently predict or control the human behaviour of 
employees, its organisations (Impala Platinum) and/or events. There must be a 
reason (the theft of PGMs) for doing the research, according to Denscombe 
(2002:25). The purpose of the research is to make predictions about future 
behaviour and to empower those who are involved in the research (Denscombe, 
2002:26-27). 
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In light of the above, the purpose of this research includes to: 
 
- Identify weaknesses in security measures at Impala Platinum mines and the 
refinery; 
- Investigate the root causes of theft of PGMs; 
- Examine the modus operandi of the perpetrators; 
- Determine whether there is any involvement of security officers in the theft of 
PGMs; and 
- Determine the roles of employees and security officers in the implementation 
and management of all security measures for mine security. 
 
The overall purpose of this research will therefore be to provide Impala Platinum with 
guidelines and advice/suggestions on how to improve and implement more effective 
and efficient security measures for the future prevention of the theft of PGMs at the 
company’s mines and refinery.  
 
Based on the study, and by identifying possible shortcomings or gaps, 
recommendations are to be formulated regarding the implementation of effective and 
efficient security measures at Impala Platinum mines and refinery – in order to 
improve the existing security measures.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to Creswell (2014: 114) research questions that are asked in mixed 
methods approach should be applicable to both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The author further stated that the research questions seek to address questions 
which enable the study to archive the objectives. Fouche and De Vos (2011: 89) 
stated that research questions are core to the research process, accordingly the 
manner in which research questions are formulated and phrased is critical, since the 
objective of the research process is aimed at answering the research questions. 
 
The questions posed in this research were as follows: 
 
- What are the causes of theft of PGMs from Impala Platinum? 
- Are employees involved in the theft of PGMs? 
5 
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- What is the role of employees in the theft of PGMs? 
- What is the extent of losses suffered by Impala Platinum? 
- What security measures are in place in the prevention of theft of PGMs at 
Impala Platinum mines and refinery? 
- Are the security measures in place effective and efficient? 
- What are the underlying reasons for the theft of PGMs? 
- Are security officers involved in the theft of PGMs? 
- Are the contractors working at Impala Platinum involved in the theft of PMGs? 
- What is the modus operandi used in the theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum 
mines and refinery? 
 
1.6 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS  
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 119), the purpose of defining key concepts is 
to prevent any misunderstandings. For the purposes of this research, key concepts 
are defined below: 
 
1.6.1 Definitions of terms 
Theft  
Snyman (1986:511) defines “theft as an unlawful and intentional appropriation of 
moveable corporeal property belonging to another with the intent to deprive the 
owner permanently of the property”. 
 
Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) 
This term refers to any metal of the Platinum group of metals including Rhodium, 
Gold, Iridium, Palladium, Platinum, Ruthenium, and the ores of such metals 
(Precious Metals Act No. 37 of 2005).  
 
Unwrought precious metals 
This term refers to unrefined metals (including concentrate and matte concentrate) or 
such that has been refined to a purity less than 99.9 per cent and which has not 
undergone any manufacturing process other than being refined or formed into a bar 
(but not a minted bar), an ingot, button, plate, sponge, powder, granules (excluding 
granules made from precious metal) refined to or beyond 99.9 per cent purity carat 
gold alloys’ solution (Precious Metals Act No. 37 of 2005).  
6 
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Criminal gang 
According to the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (Act No. 121 of 1998) criminal 
gang includes any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association, or group of 
three or more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of one or 
more criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, 
and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity. 
 
Security officer 
According to the Private Security Industry Regulation Act (Act No. 56 of 2001), a 
“security officer is any natural person who is employed by another person, including 
an organ of state, and who receives or is entitled to receive from such a person any 
remuneration, reward, fare or benefit, for rendering one or more security service”. 
 
Employee 
According to the Labour Relations Act (Act No. 66 of 1995), an employee is defined 
as “any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person 
or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer”.  
 
Money laundering 
As indicated in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No 21 of 1998, money 
laundering is the financial process used to create the impression or appearance that 
large amounts of money obtained from serious crimes – such as drug trafficking or 
terrorist activity – originated from a legitimate source. Various financial strategies are 
used to achieve this, such as using a legitimate business as a front and pushing the 
illegitimate proceeds of crime (as cash) through the business’s books. 
 
Racketeering 
As noted in the legal dictionary by Anon (2015), racketeering refers to criminal 
activity that is performed to benefit an organisation such as a crime syndicate. 
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Examples of racketeering include extortion, money laundering, bribery, and the 
obstruction of justice. 
 
Extortion 
Anon (2015) defines an extortion as “the obtaining of property from another induced 
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under colour of 
official right”. 
 
Bribery 
According to the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Act 12 of 
2004), bribery consists of unlawfully and intentionally offering to or agreeing with a 
state official – to give any consideration in return for action or inaction by him in an 
official capacity.  
 
Corruption 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Act 12 of 2004) illustrate that 
any person who, directly or indirectly accepts or agrees to accept any gratification 
from any person, whether for the benefit of himself or for the benefit of another 
person or gives or agrees to give to any other person any gratification, whether for 
the benefit of that person or for the benefit of another person is guilty thereof. 
 
Risk 
Valsamakis, Vivian and Du Toit (2005:27) defined risk as the variation of the actual 
outcome from the expected outcome. Risk therefore implies the presence of 
uncertainty and then the standard deviation is an appropriate measure of risk. The 
deviation of an actual outcome from the expected outcome implies that uncertainty 
surrounds the outcome of the event and the degree of uncertainty of the actual 
outcome about the expected outcome determines the level of risk which impacts 
potential loss. 
 
Security risk management 
“Security risk management is the process of assessing risk, taking steps to reduce 
risks to an acceptable level and maintaining that level of risk” (Blyth & Kovacich, 
2006:43-50). 
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Security risk control measures 
Security risk control measures are defined as measures that positively reduce the 
ratio of negative to positive outcomes. They are safeguards or countermeasures to 
avoid, detect, counteract or minimize security risk and help to reduce the risk of 
damage, or loss or slowing down an attack against an asset (Broder, 2006:4). 
 
X-ray full body scanner 
This is a device that detects objects (PGMs concealed) on a person’s body for 
security screening purposes – without physically removing clothes or making 
physical contact (Anon, 2015). 
 
1.7 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH  
 Since no similar research study with a specific focus on PGM mines has been done 
in South Africa before, the study will provide guidelines to the Platinum mining 
industry on how to improve any weaknesses which may be revealed in their existing 
security measures. 
 
The mining industry – in particular Impala Platinum – is losing substantial amounts of 
money as a result of the involvement of employees and organised crime syndicates 
in the theft of PGMs. The research will provide directives on how to effectively and 
efficiently improve security measures to help prevent the theft of PGMs. 
 
1.8 LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION  
The programme for the remainder of the research is as follows: 
 
Chapter 1:   Introduction and motivation for the research 
This chapter covers the problem statement, the rationale for the study, concepts, 
values, and the layout of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2:  Research methodology 
This chapter reviews the varieties of methodological probabilities dealing with 
primary and secondary data collection and methods of analysis, as implemented by 
the researcher. It will also outline sampling methods, methods used to collect the 
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research information in the field, the research problems encountered, and how they 
were dealt with. 
  
Chapter 3:  Literature review 
This reviews the existing literature and studies on the selected study topic and 
highlights gaps and shortcomings in the existing literature – so identifying the 
knowledge and problems which may exist. This chapter also sets up the research 
questions.  
 
Chapter 4:  Research findings and analysis  
This chapter presents the results of the primary research findings and an analysis 
and interpretation of the data collected. 
 
Chapter 5:  Conclusion and recommendations 
This chapter summarises the aims in relation to the key findings and points to the 
implications of the findings for both theory and practice. It also formulates 
recommendations and possible preventative and reduction measures – to combat 
the theft of PGMs from the mines and refinery. Finally, recommendations for future 
research – derived from the study – are made. 
 
1.9  CONCLUSION 
This chapter outline the introduction, motivation for the research and problem 
statement of the study. The chapter further serves to highlight the aim of the 
research, purpose of the research, research questions and value of the research as 
well as the definitions for some of the key concepts used in this study. The layout of 
different chapters is included in this chapter for easy reference. Chapter 2 will focus 
on the research methodology used during the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Schoonraad (2003:129), a research methodology is a way to 
systematically solve the research problem. It may further be understood as being a 
science of studying how research is done (Schoonraad, 2003:129). The various 
steps, adopted by the researcher during this research study, are discussed, in order 
to explain the research process followed.  
 
According to Mouton (1996:37), the methodological dimension of research is 
distinguished by three levels of application: methodological paradigms, research 
methods, and research techniques. This distinction between paradigms, methods 
and techniques will help form a better understanding of the concept ‘research 
methodology’ (Schoonraad, 2003:129). The mixed methods approach methodology 
was used by the researcher for this study to help understanding the research 
process followed. 
 
Methodological paradigms, which describe the most abstract level, include the 
distinction between qualitative, quantitative and participatory research. The 
researcher utilised the mixed methods paradigms during the research study to 
collect relevant information on the selected topic. The research methods with 
reference to sampling, data collection and data analysis – was also discussed in this 
research study.  
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:12) differentiate between the terms ‘tools’ and 
‘methodology. 
 
(i) Tools are those mechanisms or strategies that a researcher uses to 
collect, manipulate or interpret data. 
 
(ii) Research methodology refers to those tools the researcher will select to 
carry out the research project. The authors identified six general tools to 
research: 
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 The library and its resources; 
 The computer and its software; 
 Measurement techniques; 
 Statistics; 
 The human mind; and 
 Language. 
 
The researcher used the tools and research methodology as stated by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2010: 12) in this research study. 
 
Research techniques represent the most concrete level of the methodological 
dimension needed to execute specific tasks, and include specific techniques for 
sampling, data collection and data analysis (Mouton, 1996:37). The researcher also 
utilised research techniques to help meet the research goal and objective.  
 
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Huysamen (1994:10) defines a research design as “the plan or blueprint according to 
which data are to be collected to investigate the research hypothesis or question in 
the most economical manner”. According to Mouton (1996:175), the research design 
serves to “plan, structure and execute” the research – in order to maximise the 
“validity of the findings”. Directions from the underlying philosophical assumptions – 
are given to the research design and data collection.  
 
Yin (2003:19) adds further that colloquially a research design is an action plan for 
getting from here to there, where “here” may be defined as the initial set of questions 
to be answered and “there” is some set of conclusions as answers. In other words, 
the research design is the overall plan of how the research will be done, the methods 
and the research instrument and/or technique applicable to each method to be used 
to collect the information, and how the collected information and data will be 
analysed and interpreted – so leading to the formulation of the research findings. 
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According to Creswell (2014: 74) research design stipulates what data is required, 
the methods to be used to gather and analyse the data, as well as how this would 
ultimately answer the research question. Kumar (2011:94) explains a research 
design as a procedural plan that is adopted by the researcher to answer validly, 
objectively, accurately and economically. The researcher conducted empirical 
research methods in order to answer particular research questions. Moody (2002:1) 
defines empirical research methods as a class of research methods in which 
empirical observations or data are collected in order to answer particular research 
questions. 
 
2.2.1 Questionnaires for survey purposes 
According to Gillham (2008:56), a questionnaire is a research instrument which 
comprises a series of questions and other prompts, for the purpose of gathering 
information from respondents. The researcher used three separate questionnaire 
surveys to conduct interviews with the security managers, security officers and 
investigating officers working at Impala Platinum mines and refinery. Information was 
sourced from the professionals, since they are responsible for performing different 
tasks within their discipline – and their job descriptions differ from one another in 
relation to their daily tasks. This group of professionals were responsible for 
protection, prevention and investigation of theft of PGMs and other crimes in their 
field of work respectively. 
 
In developing the questionnaire, the researcher used Mariampolski’s (2001:192) 
guidelines as follows: 
 
 Focus the interviewing, therefore ask fairly general questions in order to 
stimulate further probing. 
 
 Ask open-ended questions in order to help the interviewee to outline as much 
as possible. 
 
 Ask contextual questions, for example “what, which, how and when” in order 
to encourage exploratory answers. 
 
 Use active verbs, for example, describe or explain. 
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The self-administered questionnaires for security managers contained 19 yes/no 
questions; 12 point-scale questions, and 20 open-ended questions for a total of 51 
questions; questionnaires for security investigators contained 14 yes/no questions, 
10 point-scale questions, and 20 open-ended questions for a total of 44 question; 
while for security officers there were 5 yes/no questions, 5 point-scale questions, and 
12 open-ended questions for a total of 22 questions that needed to be answered. In 
addition, a questionnaire traditionally provides information which can be expanded 
on in the one-on-one interviews – in order to gather in-depth qualitative information 
(see the appendices for the questionnaires, which are listed as Annexure B for 
security managers, Annexure C for security investigators, and Annexure D for 
security officers). 
 
2.2.2 One-on-one interviews  
According to Mason (2002:62), interviews are one of the most commonly recognised 
forms of the qualitative research approach, and the researcher utilised interviews as 
one of his data collecting methods. Interviews enable the researcher face-to-face 
discussion with respondents. According to Berg 2004: 35), the interview is a very 
effective method for collecting information for certain types of research questions 
and dealing with certain types of assumptions. The researcher undertook 40 one-on-
one interviews with permanent employees and contractors at Impala Platinum mines 
and refinery, to collect in-depth, relevant information for the study. Use was made of 
an interview schedule of questions (see Annexure F). Babbie (1992:272) 
emphasises that it is very important for the interviewer to record the answers exactly 
and no attempt should be made to summarise, paraphrase or correct bad grammar. 
In interviewing, researchers have to decide whether to take notes, which could be 
distracting, or tape the interview, which is accurate, but time consuming (Wisker, 
2001:140). The researcher decided to do both, in order not to lose any valuable 
information. 
 
2.2.3 Impala Platinum case docket analysis 
For the purposes of this study case docket analysis was done. A sample of 120 case 
dockets were selected from a 500 case-docket target population kept at Impala 
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Platinum mines and refinery – for the period January 2004 and December 2014 
(eleven years).  
 
 Of the 120 case dockets selected and perused, 90 case dockets were finalised and 
closed by Impala Platinum mines and refinery. The other 30 case dockets selected 
were not yet finalised and remained pending at Springs Magistrate Court for further 
investigation. The researcher was able to peruse pending case dockets where most 
suspects were caught in possession of PGMs. According to the case docket analysis 
done, most of the cases indicated that suspects were caught with the product in their 
possession. The researcher compiled a docket analysis pro-forma (attached in 
appendices as Annexure F). The purpose of the docket analysis pro-forma was to 
determine the day, time, location, when the theft was committed, the type of product 
stolen, the value stolen, and the modus operandi of criminals and alleged suspects 
(pending cases). The process of the pro-forma was to obtain information in relation 
to arrests, disciplinary hearings and the criminal convictions of the accused. 
 
2.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
When conducting a research it is necessary for the researcher to determine which 
approach would be implemented, since “scientific inquiry in practice typically involves 
alternating between deduction and induction. Both methods involve interplay of logic 
and observation. And both are routes to the construction of social theories” (Babbie, 
2010:53). In order for the researcher to collect relevant information for the research – 
both the qualitative and quantitative research approaches were to be used. 
According to Creswell (2014: 3), research approaches are plans and procedures for 
research that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data 
collection, analysis and interpretation. Creswell (2014: 14) further stated that a mixed 
methods approach involves combining or integrating qualitative and quantitative 
research and data in a research study. The researcher followed a mixed method 
approach in this study. 
 
2.3.1 Quantitative research approach 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 94-95) quantitative research involves 
quantities where the researcher’s aim is to establish, confirm or validate relationships 
and to develop generalisations that contribute to existing theories. Mathews and 
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Ross (2010:478) view quantitative research method as primarily concerned with 
gathering and working with data that is structured and can be presented numerically. 
The researcher used quantitative research approach to gather and work with data by 
delivering questionnaires for completion by the participants. 
 
 A quantitative research method involves collecting and converting data into a 
numerical form so that statistical calculations can be made and conclusions drawn 
(Anon, 2014). This approach enables the researcher to investigate the predictions 
about possible relationships between the different variables. The researcher 
distributed three separate questionnaires to sampled groups of security managers, 
security investigators, and security officers (total of 90 respondents) at the Impala 
Platinum mines and refinery in Springs, Gauteng Province, South Africa.  
 
2.3.2 Qualitative research approach 
According to Kraska and Neuman (2012:10), qualitative research involves 
techniques including text, language or visually based data. Henning et al (2011:3), a 
process which represents a certain freedom in the quest for depth rather that 
“quantity of understanding”. The researcher demonstrates the key aspects of a 
qualitative approach as summarised by Kraska and Neuman (2012:261). Creswell 
(2014: 4) explains qualitative research as an approach for exploring and 
understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human 
problem. 
 
 According to Anon (2014), qualitative research is about recording, analysing and 
attempting to uncover the deeper meaning and significance of human behaviour and 
experience – including contradicting beliefs, behaviours and emotions. This 
approach enabled the researcher to gain a rich and complex understanding of the 
respondents’ experiences. Mouton and Marais (1996: 155-156) state that the 
qualitative approach is an approach in which the procedures are not so strictly 
formalised, while the scope is more likely to be undefined, and a more philosophical 
mode of operation is adopted. The qualitative approach worked well in this research 
study, because verbal and non-numerical data were collected through interaction 
with people in everyday situations. The process has made it possible to record 
unexpected events and practices. Impala Platinum mines and refinery was 
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contextualised for the research study, and the qualitative approach involved a 
research process, combining case studies, interviews and questionnaires. 
 
 According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 133), the qualitative research approach 
focuses on phenomena that occur in their natural setting in the ‘real world’. The 
qualitative method was presented in the form of semi-structured individual interviews 
and as three separate questionnaires for security managers, security investigators, 
and security officers. 
 
The three separate questionnaires were hand delivered to the respondents to 
complete, and adequate time was allowed for them to complete the questionnaires. 
The researcher also had one-on-one interviews with employees and contractors, and 
notes were taken during that interview schedules. 
 
2.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
2.4.1  Sampling size 
According to Black and Champion (1976:167), a sample is a portion of an element 
taken from a population – which is considered to be representative of the target 
population sampled. For this study, the target population comprised 150 Protection 
Services members (security managers, security investigators and security officers), 
70 employees and 30 contractors employed permanently at Impala Platinum mines 
and refinery. For the purposes of this study, a sample of 90 respondents comprising 
security managers, security investigators and security officers was utilised for the 
questionnaire survey. For the one-on-one interviews, a sample of 30 employees and 
10 contractors was drawn from a target population group. 
 
There are various sampling procedures which can be used. Non-probability sampling 
includes: convenience, judgement, quota and snowball sampling methods (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2007:201-202). Probability sampling procedures also has four types: simple 
random, systematic, stratified, and cluster. For this research, random probability 
sampling was used by the researcher. Probability sampling – according to Babbie 
and Mouton (2007:201-202) and Welman and Kruger (2001: 47) – is the most 
effective method for the selection of study elements, as it avoids the researcher’s 
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conscious or unconscious biases in element selection, and also permits estimates of 
sampling error. In this way the validity of the data collected can be ensured.  
 
Probability Sampling has a positive influence with regard to the selection of study 
elements in terms of the accuracy of the research results (Babbie & Mouton, 
2007:202). Bailey (1987:81-82) states that the population includes all individuals or 
cases of a certain type. According to Welman and Kruger (2002:47), a probability 
sample will ensure that a representative sample is drawn from the population – 
where each member of the population has an equal opportunity of being selected. 
As Rescoe (1975), as cited in Sakasan (2000:296) states: “[s]ample sizes larger than 
30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most research”. For this research, a sample 
size of 90 respondents comprising security managers, security investigators and 
security officers, as well as 30 employees and 10 contractors – for one-on-one 
interviews – was drawn. 
 
2.4.2  Selection of security managers, investigators and security officers for 
questionnaire survey 
For this study, the target population comprised 150 Protection Services members 
(security managers, security investigators and security officers) deployed at Impala 
Platinum refinery and mines. For the purposes of this study, a sample of 90 
respondents comprising security managers, security investigators and security 
officers was utilised for the questionnaire survey.  
 
The researcher targeted the study population for the questionnaire survey to a 
sample of 60 security officers, 20 security investigators, and 10 security managers 
from a target population of 150.including 10 contractors.  
 
Written permission to interview security managers, security investigators, security 
officers and employees was obtained from Impala Platinum mines and refinery prior 
to data collection. 
 
According to Mouton and Marais (1996: 50), the aim of the researcher is to study a 
representative number of people – with a view of generalising the results of the study 
to a defined population. In this research, the results can be generalised, since the 
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sample group of 60 security officers, 20 security investigators, and 10 security 
managers, is a valid representative sample and was chosen without any bias for the 
target population identified for the study. 
 
2.4.3  Selection of Impala employees and permanent contactors for interviews 
For this research study, the target population comprised 70 employees and 30 
permanent contractors deployed at Impala Platinum refinery and mines. For the one-
on-one interviews, a sample of 30 employees and 10 contractors was drawn from a 
target population group. In this study, the outcome can be generalised, since the 
sample population group of 30 employees and 10 contractors is a valid 
representative sample group and was chosen without any bias for the target 
population from a target population of 100. 
 
2.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND FIELDWORK PRACTICE 
For this study, four different kinds of data-collection methods were used: physical 
visits at the refinery, questionnaires, one-on-one interviews, and investigation case 
dockets. Cohen (1989:181) defines a questionnaire as a self-report instrument used 
for gathering information about variables of interest for an investigation. For this 
research, three separate questionnaires were utilised in order to acquire baseline 
information and to deduce conclusions about the prevention of theft of PGMs. 
 
 Maxfield and Babbie (2005:209) emphasise that the value of research depends on 
how the data are gathered. Most of the data were collected by means of three 
separate questionnaires. One questionnaire of 22 questions for security officers was 
compiled, one questionnaire of 44 questions was compiled for security investigators, 
and 51 questions for security managers were compiled as the group performed 
different security activities in their workplace – such as guarding, patrolling, 
monitoring security cameras, investigations and management. The self-administered 
questionnaires for security managers contained 19 yes/no questions, 14 point-scale 
questions, and 20 open-ended questions; questionnaires for security investigators 
contained 14 yes/no questions, 10 point-scale questions, and 20 open-ended 
questions; and questionnaires for security officers contained 5 yes/no questions, 5 
point-scale questions, and 12 open-ended questions – for a total of 117 questions 
that needed to be answered. The respondents were offered adequate times to 
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complete the questionnaires since the questionnaires were left with the respondents 
to complete in their own time – with a given return date (in the appendices the 
questionnaire for security officers is attached as Annexure B; for security 
investigators as Annexure C; and for security managers as Annexure D).  
 
 For the purpose of this study, the researcher also conducted one-on-one semi-
structured interviews involving two interest groups, namely 30 employees and 10 
contractors – who are permanently deployed at Impala Platinum mines and refinery. 
This was because it was the most flexible and useful way of communication. The two 
interest groups were interviewed so that they could – face-to-face – air their views of 
the nature and extent of theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum mines and refinery. The 
researcher posed questions regarding the modus operandi of the syndicates to the 
two interest groups, as well as the syndicate size, in order to explain the way in 
which PGMs are stolen by the syndicates and the total number of people involved in 
the theft of PGMs. Where the interviewees failed to provide detailed information or 
clarity, the researcher will pose additional, probing follow-up questions to obtain 
more information on the topic. According to Rubin and Rubin (1995:145, as cited in 
De Vos, Strydom, Fouche & Delport, 2011: 299), “the interviewer probes to complete 
or clarify the answer or to request further examples or evidence”. During data 
collection, the researcher recorded potentially useful data thoroughly, accurately and 
systematically – by making notes. 
 
 Yin (1984:23) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used. The approach in this research was to 
investigate the theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum mines and refinery within its real-life 
context and to obtain sources of evidence for the problem. In this research study, a 
sample of 120 case dockets were selected from a 500 case docket target population 
of Impala Platinum mines and refinery – for the period January 2004 and December 
2014 (eleven years).  Of the 120 case dockets selected and perused, 90 case 
dockets were finalised and closed by Impala Platinum Refinery. The other 30 case 
dockets selected were not yet finalised – and remain pending at the Springs 
Magistrate Court for further investigation. 
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 For this study, the researcher utilised five steps: to determine and define the 
research questions, to select the cases and determine data gathering and analysis 
techniques, to collect the data, to evaluate and analyse the data, and to prepare the 
research report. 
 
2.6 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Bogdan and Biklen (2003:48) define qualitative data analysis as “working with the 
data, organising, breaking it into manageable units, coding, synthesising them, and 
searching for patterns”. The aim of analysis of qualitative data is to discover patterns, 
concepts, themes and meanings (Yin, 2003: 56). Yin (2003:56) further discusses the 
need for searching data for “patterns” – which may explain or identify casual links in 
the database. For this study, the researcher concentrated on the whole dataset first, 
then attempted to take it apart, and then re-constructed it again more meaningfully 
after analysis, synthesis and interpretation had been applied. All the data and 
research information gathered by the researcher were collated, analysed and 
interpreted by means of categories through constant patterns, themes and 
meanings. Maxfield and Babbie (2005:107) point out that content analysis by means 
of decoding is the most suitable technique for qualitative research comparison, 
discovery of patterns, typologies, matrices or charting by the researcher. 
 
2.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
2.7.1 Ensuring validity 
It is necessary to validate the responses of the respondents. This is done by 
examining the responses for completeness and honesty to see whether the 
information provided represents a consensus or a minority (opposing/different) point 
of view. The researcher ensured that validity – in terms of Welman and Kruger 
(1999: 100) – was applied during the research process. The researcher ensured that 
the research questions and interviews conducted were the same, as posed to all 
respondents and interviewees. 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2009: 20), validity is when the researcher honestly 
measures what he/she has set out to do. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 28), 
“validity of an instrument is the extent to which the instrument measures what it is 
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supposed to measure”. Validity is concerned with the accuracy of the questions 
asked, the data collected, and the explanation offered (Denscombe, 2002:100). 
 
In this study, the different forms of validity were applied to all of the instruments. 
 
Content validity 
The content validity of the questionnaire was determined by the literature review, 
case dockets perusal and site visit by the researcher. All the questionnaire survey 
questions posed to the participants were relevant to the research study, thus 
ensuring validity. The literature utilised and site visit by the researcher were 
contemplated to be valid since it consisted of journals, articles and other sources, 
thereby ensuring validity (Mouton, 2001:101). All the posed questions, data 
collection and explanations from the respondents were contemplated to be relevant 
to the research study and ensured validity. 
 
Face validity 
This validity refers to the extent of the research instrument and what it intends to 
achieve. The one-on-one interview schedule questions posed to the respondents 
were relevant after considering the concepts and variances involved with the 
relationships being investigated (Welman et al, 2005;174). 
 
Construct validity 
Construct validity is more concerned with the underlying attributes of the results of 
the questionnaire. The questionnaires were perused to ensure that the questions 
posed reflected to the phenomenon of theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum refinery and 
mines. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents and interviewees was upheld 
throughout the research process by the researcher. The researcher ensured that all 
the respondents and interviewees were notified that the information they provide 
would be treated with the strictest of confidentiality, and that no personal details of 
the interviewees would be used during the study or revealed in the resulting research 
report. In other words – identities of individuals participating in the study will remain 
anonymous (anonymity was guaranteed with no identities being revealed). During 
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perusal of the Impala Platinum case dockets, personal information with regard to 
complainant(s), witnesses and accused person(s) was not used in any way during 
the study. The information obtained from case dockets was also treated with strict 
confidentiality. 
 
The information provided during the research process was measured and compared 
to ensure validity and reliability. The researcher used four methods to provide 
evidence of the validity of the data collected (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010: 92). In ensuring 
validity, the researcher ensured that the methods used were administered in a 
consistent way, and that the methods used to collect the data were accurate, honest 
and on target. The researcher also remained as objective as possible throughout the 
research study in terms of the four methods used. 
 
2.7.2 Ensuring reliability  
Reliability refers to the consistency of the measurement – which means that every 
time the same variable is measured under different conditions, it will still provide the 
same or similar results (De Vos et al, 2011: 162-163). According to Maxfield and 
Babbie (2005:129) and Mouton and Marais (1992: 81), reliability means that the 
results obtained must be replicable if the same research is conducted by another 
researcher. 
  
Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:129) state that reliability is the extent to which the 
observable measures that represent a theoretical concept are accurate and stable 
when used for the concept in several studies. In achieving reliability, the researcher 
did in fact ensure that the methods were administered in a consistent and accurate 
way. 
 
Cohen and Manion (2000:254) define data triangulation as an attempt to map out, or 
explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour – by studying it 
from more than one standpoint. The purpose of data triangulation in mixed 
methodology is to increase the credibility and validity of the results. The researcher 
utilised data triangulation to ensure reliability – in which more than one data source 
was used. The questionnaires consisted of open and closed-ended questions and 
were triangulated with the other sets of collected information, namely the interviews 
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and the docket analysis case study – in order to collate the results that were 
obtained from them all. 
 
2.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010: 101-102) and Babbie (2001:38), it is 
important to comply with the following ethical issues during a research study. The 
researcher submitted a letter requesting permission to conduct research at the 
refinery (see Annexure H in appendices) and complied as follows: 
 
 Obtained informed consent from each participant – whether a respondent or 
interviewee. In this context voluntary participation is a first prerequisite. 
Participants should be given sufficient information concerning the research 
study and topic to be able to make an informed decision about whether to 
participate or to withdraw. The researcher gave the participants a 
comprehensive synopsis of the nature of the research, after which the 
necessary consent was obtained in writing with a signed Consent Form (see 
Annexure E in appendices). 
 
 Protected the participants from harm. The researcher endeavoured to conduct 
the interviews under circumstances where the participants were comfortable 
and not exposed to any stress or embarrassment. 
 
 The right to privacy was respected. No responses by a participant were in any 
way disclosed by the researcher in a manner that might expose or reveal the 
identity of specific participant – unless the participant agree in writing to such 
disclosure. The researcher allocated a code number to each of the participants, 
in order to honour their privacy and protect their identities. 
 
 Honesty with professional colleagues. Researchers may not fabricate data to 
support a specific finding. The researcher was cognisant of the requirement to 
ensure that all sources are acknowledged and refrained from plagiarism. 
 
 Sources consulted. Reference was made to all sources incorporated in the 
research, by including them into the list of references. 
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 Permission to undertake the research at Impala Platinum mines and refinery 
was also sought and granted (see approval letter from the Group Production 
Manager, Impala Platinum, as Annexure I in appendices). 
 
The researcher ensured that during the research study, ethical issues such as 
protection from harm, informed consent and right to privacy and voluntary 
participation were considered and adhered to – for the purpose of this research.  
 
The researcher ensured that consent forms (proforma Consent Form in appendices 
as Annexure E) were completed by the interviewees before the interviews were 
conducted and the interview questions were the same. The consent was also 
obtained from the respondents who completed the questionnaire survey questions 
(see example of proforma for the questionnaire respondents in appendices as 
Annexure J for security managers; appendices as Annexure K for security 
investigators and appendices as Annexure L for security officers). The survey 
questionnaire questions were more or less the same although security managers 
and security investigators questions were longer than that of the security officers. All 
the participants who were interviewed as well as the participants who completed the 
survey questionnaire questions were informed about the research study and its 
objectives.  
 
The researcher ensured that the anonymity of all the interviewees was guaranteed 
and that compliance with the Code of Ethics for Research of UNISA was instituted 
throughout. All interviewees were notified that the information they provided would 
be treated with strict confidentiality. 
 
2.9 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING RESEARCH 
2.9.1 Negative attitude towards completing the questionnaires 
The researcher compiled three questionnaires – one questionnaire each for the 
security managers, the security investigators, and the security officers at Impala 
Platinum. All three questionnaires were hand delivered to the respective groups’ line 
managers for distribution to the selected sample population – since they had agreed 
to participate in the research. 
 
25 
©University of South Africa 2016 
Of the 90 sample population selected, 60 were security officers, 20 were security 
investigators, and 10 were security managers. The researcher hand delivered 60 
questionnaires to security officers, 10 questionnaires to security managers, and 20 
questionnaires to security investigators. Of the 60 questionnaires delivered to 
security officers, only 50 responded by successfully completing and returning them. 
The 60 questionnaires delivered to security officers differ from the questionnaires 
sent to security managers and security investigators. The reason why security 
officers did not respond to all 60 delivered questionnaires was that some had 
insufficient time to do so. All of the 10 hand-delivered questionnaires to security 
managers, as well as the 20 questionnaires given to security investigators were 
successfully completed and returned. In total then, 80 questionnaires were returned 
of the 90 hand delivered (89% response rate). However, some of respondents 
complained about the length of the questionnaire: they did not have enough time to 
complete all the questions in detail as required. The researcher felt that the 
respondents had a negative attitude about completing the questionnaires – since 
most of the questions only needed short, detailed ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. 
 
2.9.2 Geographic difficulties 
The research was undertaken at Impala Platinum refinery and mines. The refinery is 
in Springs on the East Rand area of Gauteng Province. 
 
The researcher’s focus was on the refinery in Springs, since that is where the 
product is refined to its last stage: a final ‘pure’ product. Seven PGMs, i.e. Platinum, 
Palladium, Gold, Ruthenium, Iridium and Silver are produced in the refinery – first in 
the salt form (yellow substance) and then in the pure end product. It is also where 
the theft of PGMs is committed. The syndicates consider that it is not worth the effort 
to steal matte, as the value is too low and the recovery process to convert it to a 
purer end-product state is too long. The researcher did not encounter any challenges 
as a result of the study location, since research sites for handing out the 
questionnaires and one-on-one interviews were within a reasonable travelling 
distance of each other. The travelling distance is about 25 km – and the researcher 
lives and works in the Springs area. 
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2.9.3 Incomplete questionnaires 
The researcher received back 80 of the 90 submitted questionnaires. He understood 
that all incomplete questionnaires were as a result of officers having insufficient time 
to complete them. Another challenge the researcher encountered was the often 
illegible handwriting of some of the respondents. The researcher could not always 
clearly read the answers.  
 
2.9.4 Number of completed questionnaires 
 In total 90 questionnaires were hand delivered to security officers, security 
managers, and security investigators. 80 questionnaires were returned successfully 
completed (ten were not completed). The researcher understood that the response 
was therefore good, since only ten questionnaires were not filled in at all. In essence, 
security officers, security investigators and security managers, overall, responded 
positively to the research. 
 
2.9.5 Selection of contractors and employees for one-on-one interviews 
Employees were randomly selected for the interviews. After the researcher identified 
the employees via the randomly selected sampling method, he then conducted the 
one-on-one interviews. The researcher compiled a list (schedule) of interview 
questions, which was used during interviews. For this purpose, 30 employees were 
selected. All interview questions posed by the researcher to the interviewees were 
answered by the selected employees.  
 
Ten permanent contractors were also randomly selected for interviews. The same 
interview questions used for employees were also used during interviews with 
contractors. The researcher identified the contractors and conducted one-on-one 
interviews. The identified contractors were from KMA Workforce and LADS 
construction.  
 
2.9.6 Issues regarding case docket analysis 
As soon as the permission letter to undertake the research at Impala Platinum was 
received by the researcher, 120 case dockets were selected from the Impala 
Platinum Refinery site. Ninety case dockets that were selected, were finalised, 
closed and filed by Impala Platinum. The 90 filed case dockets were perused by the 
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researcher and according to the case dockets, accused persons were found guilty of 
being in possession of PGMs. The other 30 case dockets were still on the court roll 
and pending. The researcher was able to peruse pending case dockets – where 
most suspects were caught in possession of PGMs.  
 
2.9.7 Coding of information  
The researcher compiled three different master coding sheets – one for security 
officers, one for security managers, and one for security investigators. The purpose 
was to analyse information received from security officers, security managers, and 
security investigators regarding theft of PGMs, and also their personal views on the 
matter. 
 
The yes/no questions and the open-ended questions were drawn up in the coding 
process. The coding lists were captured into the software programme Microsoft 
Excel, and all answers were categorised. The questions of the three sets of 
questionnaires, interview responses and dockets analysis, were coded and clustered 
on Excel spread sheets before statistical analysis was applied to every set of coded 
question responses. 
 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the researcher utilised the mixed methods paradigms approach to 
collect relevant information for this study. This chapter provided the empirical 
component of the research study. It outlines a description of the research strategy, 
design, approach methods, and techniques/research instruments used to obtain the 
research information – and also how all the collected information and data were 
collated, analysed, compared and synthesised in order to obtain the final research 
results. The different phases of the research methodology were discussed: sampling 
and population, data collection, data analysis, validity and reliability, as well as 
ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 3 will focus on the literature review – wherein the impact and extent of the 
theft of PGMs is comprehensively discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN OVERVIEW OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Snyman (1986:511) defines theft as an “unlawful and intentional appropriation of 
moveable corporeal property belonging to another with the intent to deprive the 
owner permanently of the property”. The crime syndicates operating at, and even 
from within, the Impala Platinum mines and refinery deprive the organisation 
permanently of their property – which is Platinum Group Metals (PGMs). Theft of 
PGMs is driven by organised crime syndicates and involves employees and 
contractors within Impala Platinum mines and refinery, as well as other syndicates 
outside Impala Platinum. 
 
This chapter will focus on the extent and impact of the theft of PGMs at Impala 
Platinum mines and its refinery. This will include the organised crime syndicates and 
role players that are involved in the theft of PGMs. Although sociologists have 
offered a number of theories to help explain crime and criminal behaviour, rarely 
have these been directed specifically at organised crime, as pertaining to the theft of 
PGMs (Abadinsky, 2013:80). For the purposes of this study, the researcher is of the 
view that the theft of PGMs in South Africa is by organised crime syndicates, and is 
therefore a possible explanation of this specific crime and the criminal behaviour of 
the perpetrators involved. 
 
No hardcopy published academic works made any direct reference to the research 
topic, but information was found on the topic from the internet and other sources. 
Therefore, most of the information obtained on the theft of PGMs was from the 
internet and from data in newspapers, magazines, chronicles, journals, annual 
general reports. In addition, research information was collected by means of a 
physical site visit to and observation at the Impala Platinum Refinery in Springs by 
the researcher. 
 
Hans Merensky – a geologist, prospector, scientist, nature conservationist and 
philanthropist – unearthed in South Africa some of the greatest mineral deposits. In 
1924, he discovered two reefs containing PGMs in what is known as the Bushveld 
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Igneous Complex: a horse-shoe-shaped geological feature that is confined to the 
northern parts of the Steelpoort area in Limpopo Province, South Africa. Mining for 
Platinum ore started in September 1924 and this ore bears the name: the Merensky 
Reef (Gastrow, 2001:24). Gastrow (2001:24) contends that the problem of product 
theft from Platinum mines and plants is therefore confined to a relatively manageable 
geographical area – in comparison to the much wider distribution in South Africa of 
gold and diamond mines. 
 
3.1.1 Platinum Group Metals mining industry in South Africa 
According to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the three top mining 
organisation/companies in South Africa producing PGMs are Anglo Platinum, Impala 
Platinum and Lonmin Platinum. Impala Platinum operations are based in Rustenburg 
in the North West Province and at its refinery in Springs on the East Rand in 
Gauteng Province. The above-mentioned mines produce different PGMs – but their 
primary product is platinum. 
 
3.2 THE ROLE OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
According to Coetzee and Horn (2007:1), “the achievements of the mining industry 
and its contribution to the South African economy are truly remarkable”. According to 
the authors it is a crucial foreign exchange earner and a substantial contributor to 
economic production. 
 
The mining industry remains as a leading employer and a leader in the field of 
technological scientific research – to the benefit of all South African (Coetzee & 
Horn, 2007:1). The mining industry, and in particular the platinum producing mines, 
has made a special contribution to the transformation of society and improves the 
quality of life of South African citizens (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:1). 
 
Impala Platinum mines and refinery produces approximately 4 million ounces of 
PGMs a year, of which two million ounces is platinum. The operation also produces 
the highest first-pass yields (PGMs output percentages) in the industry. It employed 
an average of 52 000 workers, including contractors, in its all operations in South 
Africa (Anon, 2013). 
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According to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the platinum producing industry 
is the largest producer of PGMs in the world and produces 75 per cent of the world’s 
PGMs. Platinum is an extremely valuable commodity, as its unique physical and 
chemical properties allow for unlimited different applications. According to Venter 
(2006), platinum is sought after worldwide as a result of the higher price compared to 
other commodities such as Gold, Iridium, Palladium, Ruthenium, and Rhodium. 
Precious metals are the national asset of South Africa and earn large amounts of 
foreign currency – and provide substantial employment opportunities (Potgieter, 
2011).  
 
South Africa needs a stable and growing mining industry in order to increase its 
economic growth. Mining has been a key feature of this country’s economy for more 
than 130 years. The mining sector has remained the cornerstone of the economy, 
even though now smaller, relative to the size of the overall economy. According to 
the Chamber of Mines (2014), the mining sector accounted for 8.8 per cent of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) on a nominal basis. If the indirect multiplier 
and induced effects of mining are included, then the overall contribution to GDP is 
closer to 18 per cent. The mining sector employed about one million people – 
including nationals from neighbouring countries. 
 
3.3 THE FOUR COMPLICATED RECOVERY PROCESSES FOR PGMS  
According to Geldenhuys (2013:19), the high risk areas for theft of PGMs, are in the 
plants at the refinery, where the ore passes through different phases of crushing, 
extraction and refining. In other words, the phases of crushing and extraction take 
place during the process of recovery of PGMs and the final end product is refined 
into PMGs as required. Some thefts occur at the stage in the recovery process 
where the base metals are removed from the converter matte (black granules 
substance) (Geldenhuys, 2013:19). According to Geldenhuys (2013:19), the 
activities of thieves become more intense as the refining process moves closer to its 
final stages. An example is when syndicate members deliberately contaminated a 
batch of platinum sponge during the final refining. They anticipated that the 
contaminated batch would be rejected and returned for refining in a less secure area 
– where it would be possible for them to remove and hide it unnoticed. According to 
Gastrow (2001:25), the recovery process of PGMs has to go through four 
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complicated stages of concentration, smelting, base metals removal and precious 
metals refining. The recovery processes of PGMs are outlined as follows: 
 
 Concentration: During this process, the ore is deposited into fine particles with 
the aim of liberating and recovering the mineral particles in the form of a 
concentrate, by froth flotation. 
 
 Smelting: The flotation concentrate is then melted in an electric furnace. On 
melting, concentrate separates into two layers. The upper layer is a slag, which 
is tapped off, and then either discarded or returned to concentration. The lower 
layer is a converter matte, which is sent for base metal removal. 
 
 Base metal removal: base metals are removed from the converter matte. They 
constitute a valuable by-product of PGM extraction and the extent to which they 
are further refined is largely dictated by economies of scale. The concentrate 
which remains after the removal of base metals, is the sent for further 
processing into refined precious metals. 
 
 Precious metals refining: Refining processes during this phase differ and 
improved methods are constantly being introduced. During this time, PGMs are 
finally separated into individual metals at the Precious Metal Refinery. 
 
3.4 PRECIOUS METALS REFINERY PROCESS 
The Precious Metals Refinery (PMR) is part of the Impala Platinum Refinery situated 
in Springs, Gauteng Province. It is based upon some of the most efficient, discrete, 
quantitative separation processes available. The PMR receives the dried PGM 
concentrate from the Base Metal Refinery (BMR), and during this process is when 
there is theft of PGMs by employees working with the product on a daily basis (Anon, 
2013). According to Gastrow (2001:25), the theft of PGMs occurs during the process 
of the refining where the product is refined into individual PGMs – using highly 
automated extraction processes that have a positive impact. The PMR plant at 
Impala Platinum Refinery produces the following PGMs: 
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 Platinum - the premier metal of the group has a number of unique qualities, 
which make it a sought-after metal for a multitude of applications. It is a key 
ingredient in the manufacture of environmentally friendly auto catalysts, and 
fuel cells.  
 
 Palladium – also used in the manufacture of auto catalysts and fuel cells. It is 
again used in the manufacture of electronic components such as multi-layer 
ceramic capacitors and in dental alloys.  
 
 Rhodium – its main use is in auto catalysts. It is also used in the glass making 
and chemical sectors and in cancer-detecting equipment in the medical sector. 
 
 Ruthenium – used in the chemical and electronic industries.  
 
 Iridium - also used in electrodes for the production of chlorine, in platinum 
alloys for use in applications such as jewellery manufacture, and in electrodes 
for medical devices.  
 
 Gold - used in applications such as jewellery and in dental alloys. 
 
3.5 EXTENT OF THEFT OF PGMs  
South African Platinum-producing mines face a number of challenges ranging from 
the ‘weak’ economy (i.e. particularly the current economic downturn since 2008), 
rising mining costs to crime (in this case the actual theft of mined PGMs). According 
to industry sources, South Africa loses billions of rand a year through stolen precious 
metals which are then smuggled out of the country. The continuing theft of PGMs 
could negatively influence the profitability of marginal mines to such an extent that 
the mines would have to stop production and lay off some or their entire workforce 
(Potgieter, 2011). 
 
According to Coetzee and Horn (2007:10), the theft of PGMs in South Africa is a 
problem as old as the mining industry itself. South African platinum producing mines 
face a number of challenges from the strength of the South African economy and 
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rising mining costs, and also through to crime (Potgieter, 2011). The continuing theft 
of PGMs could negatively influence the profitability of marginal mines to such an 
extent that the mines would have to stop production and lay off some of their 
workforce (Potgieter, 2011). 
 
The theft of PGMs occurs mostly above ground during the extraction process. This is 
because Platinum can only be removed from its ore state through the complicated 
process of refining and extraction. In contrast, gold can be easily identified as a 
valuable metal (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:35).  
 
A Security Risk Management Model was utilised to enable the researcher to conduct 
this study. In the next section, a description of the model and how security 
practitioners could apply the model at their organisation – to assist in the fight 
against crime, in particular the theft of PGMs – is given.  
 
3.6 THE ORGANISED CRIME THREATS 
According to the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (Act no 121 of 1998) 
there are measures in place to combat organised crime, money laundering and 
criminal gang activities – in order to prohibit certain activities relating to racketeering 
activities. According to the Act, organised crime can be defined as a group of 
individuals or organisations operating as an illegal business – for profit. 
 
Conklin (2010:73) defines organised crime as criminal activity by an enduring 
structure or organisation developed or devoted primarily to the pursuit of profit 
through illegal means. Organised crime has the characteristics of a formal 
organisation, a division of labour, co-ordination of activities through rules and codes, 
and allocation of tasks in order to achieve certain goals. The organisation tries to 
preserve itself in the face of external and internal threats (Anon, 2013).  
 
Swain (2009:5) defines ‘organised crime’ as a group of individuals or an organisation 
engaging in criminal activity for the purpose of procuring tangible, political or 
ideological gain.  
 
34 
©University of South Africa 2016 
According to Potgieter (2011), organised crime in South Africa and internationally 
poses a huge challenge to the mining industry and to governments. The crime 
syndicates will always supply the PGMs – as long as there is a market for them.  
 
Coetzee and Horn (2007:74) hold that the government must consider two main 
concerns when it comes to the organised-crime threat. Firstly, organised crime 
creates an economy outside the scope of official markets. This part of the economy 
is not taxable by the state – with considerable loss of revenue implications. 
Secondly, this is one of the few crimes that threaten the sovereignty of the state; it 
lays the foundation for corruption within government and political structures. The 
business sector is also vulnerable to organised crime groups – who use it to launder 
illicit gains back into the legitimate financial system. 
 
According to the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, organised crime, money 
laundering and criminal gang activities – both individually and collectively – present a 
danger to public order and safety, and also economic stability, and have the potential 
to inflict social damage. The Act, 1998 further states that South African common law 
and statutory law fail to deal effectively with organised crime, money laundering and 
criminal gang activities – and also fail to keep pace with international measures 
aimed at dealing effectively with organised crime, money laundering, and criminal 
gang activities. 
 
Considering that the mining industry has become a target for organised criminal 
activity, it is imperative that the problem be addressed with effective collaboration 
between the mining industry and government – at all levels (Coetzee & Horn, 
2007:75). The mining industry – together with the Organised Crime Unit and National 
Prosecution Authority – should utilise the Prevention of Organised Crime Act to 
address organised crime activities. The investigation should be conducted in a 
project that involves law-enforcement agencies and the mining industry. 
 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act is an effective tool to address organised 
criminal activities within the mining industry, as it relates to offences such as 
racketeering, proceeds of unlawful activities, and criminal gang activities. Organised 
crime syndicate members when apprehended, and offences such as racketeering 
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and criminal gang activities should be added to the other offences when the 
suspects are charged. The Act also prescribes the forfeiture of property and 
preservation of property order. 
 
According to Anon (2013), the criminal threat to the Precious Metals Industry 
includes two main threats: internal and external. The threats are outlined as follows: 
 
3.6.1 Internal threat  
 It is evident that one of the primary threats is from inside the company itself – 
meaning that own employees, including males and females, are involved in the 
theft or the facilitation of the theft of PGMs. 
 
 Employees exploit and abuse permanent contractors, including security 
officers, to remove PGMs from the refinery after being processed in a salt 
format or when it is pure metal. 
 
 Employees steal PGMs at the refinery in Springs – since they work with the 
product and have access to it. They hand the product over to the contractors 
(KMA Workforce, Lads Construction and Bidvest Protea Coin). 
 
 The contractors that are exploited and abused are males, as they are the only 
permanent contractors (KMA Workforce, Lads Construction and Bidvest Protea 
Coin) deployed to Impala to perform specific jobs. 
 
 The contractors (KMA Workforce, Lads Construction and Bidvest Protea Coin) 
are trained by the employees to make up rectum parcels and together with the 
employees remove it from the refinery. 
 
 When contractors succeed in removing PGMs from the Refinery, they are 
rewarded by the employees who exploited their positions as contractors – for a 
job well done. 
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 If the employees and/or contractors are arrested before removing PGMs from 
the refinery, the syndicates provide money to the family of the arrested person 
to pay bail or provide a legal representative (Anon, 2013). 
 
3.6.2 External threats 
 These include highly sophisticated professional syndicates ranging from Level 
Two to Level Five operatives (see later section for more detailed explanation 
of organised crime syndicate levels). 
 
 The crime syndicates have access to illegal and sometimes legal international 
operations. 
 
 The criminal activities are highly organised – with contacts in the high-ranking 
structures of the SAPS Organised Crime Unit and even in Parliament. 
 
 Hand-in-hand with money laundering, they also undertake drug 
smuggling/trafficking and other commercial crimes (Anon, 2013).  
 
3.7 MODUS OPERANDI OF ORGANISED CRIME SYNDICATES 
Modus operandi is a Latin term meaning behaviour, comportment or operational 
procedure (Horgan, 1979:57). According to Du Plessis (1989:84), modus operandi is 
a means of identification which is based on the fact that many offenders tend to use 
the same method time and again, when committing a crime. A more comprehensive 
description is that modus operandi are the habits and techniques of criminals that 
over time have become stereotyped and become the routine mode of conduct in 
which individualised techniques are employed (Van Heerden, 1985:10).  
 
Accordingly, the modus operandi for the theft of PGMs can be outlined as follows: 
Impala Platinum management are in agreement that the theft of PGMs throughout 
the mining industry is the work of highly sophisticated organised crime syndicates. It 
was discovered that the theft of these metals was directly linked to a ring of well 
organised criminals who acquired the product from its source and passed on through 
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a smuggle chain to various receivers, and on up the chain to Level Five operatives. 
The latter are usually outside the borders of South Africa (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:81).  
 
So the theft and smuggle chain has many criminal role-players from source (local) to 
end market (international). So the crime syndicates make use of employees from the 
mines and the refinery (local level) to acquire the product at source. These 
employees (as used or manipulated by the organised crime syndicates) tend to 
make use of condoms, surgical gloves and sample bags to make up parcels suitable 
to be inserted in the rectum – in order to steal (foundational action in the theft and 
smuggle chain) and smuggle out the PGMs.  
 
The Level One actors (employees and contractors at source) of the crime syndicates 
at the refinery, would tape up the PGMs with insulation tape and/or masking tape 
and hide the product inside body orifices with the motive of taking the PGMs from the 
refinery. These are known as rectum parcels. They will exit the plant through the 
search area without being detected (Anon, 2013). It is evident from the research 
study that these criminals follow a constant, stereotyped pattern of conduct and 
employ individualised techniques when stealing PGMs. 
 
3.8 ORGANISED CRIME SYNDICATES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The crime syndicates that focus solely on PGMs make the mining industry the victim 
of organised crime groups. The crime syndicates operate nationally and 
internationally and are highly organised. They also commit other crimes such as 
money laundering, racketeering, and other commercial crimes (Coetzee & Horn, 
2007:81). The criminal syndicates involved in the theft of PGMs operate nationally 
and internationally and comprise five levels of criminals (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:81). 
The crime syndicates are classified into five levels: Level Five at the top of the 
hierarchy and Level One at the bottom. Level Five syndicates are usually based 
outside South Africa and Level Four to one operate within the country (Coetzee & 
Horn, 2007:81). 
 
Goredema (2001:1) defines organised crime, in the South African context, as 
systematic criminal activity of a serious nature committed by a structured group of 
individuals or a corporate body in order to obtain, secure or retain, directly or 
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indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. This definition is broad enough to 
embrace participation in organised crime groups, serious economic crimes, violent 
crimes, corruption, money-laundering, the possession of and trafficking in narcotics, 
trafficking in humans and obstructing of course of justice. In accordance with this 
definition, there is usually an economic importance at the core of organised crime. 
 
Troung (2001:3) also holds the same view as Goredema regarding the economic 
rewards of organised crime. He describes an organised crime group as any group 
that has a corporate structure and whose main aim is to make profit through illegal 
activities that survive on fear of victims and corruption of business activities. 
 
While varying in form and structure, South African organised crime syndicates share 
a number of common characteristics (Shaw 1998:12), as follows: 
 
 A hierarchy of control, with clearly designated systems of promotion and 
payment 
 
 Sophisticated procedures, often via legitimate business interest, to launder 
money by means of illegal activities and  
 
 The use of weapons to ensure that business routes are protected and 
potential competitors eliminated. 
 
These common characteristics as described by Shaw (1998:12) do not make 
mention of the fact that, in South Africa, corruption is also at the core of organised 
criminal groups. 
 
Figure 3.1 indicates the categories of organised crime syndicates operating in South 
Africa. It illustrates levels from five to one and their roles in the crime environment. 
The crime syndicates operate in all spheres of South Africa and internationally.  
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Figure 3.1:  Categories of organised crime syndicates 
 
   
 
LEVEL 5 
Illegal international buyers 
 
   
 
LEVEL 4 
Illegal national buyers 
 
   
 
LEVEL 3 
Illegal regional buyers 
 
   
 
LEVEL 2 
Runners and illegal smelt houses 
 
   
 
LEVEL 1 
Theft at source 
(employees, contractors, couriers, intruders, 
illegal miners) 
 
   
(Adapted from Coetzee & Horn, 2007:81) 
 
3.8.1 Level Five: Illegal international operatives 
According to Coetzee and Horn (2007:82), the illegal international operatives are 
generally international buyers who are situated abroad and operate abroad – 
although they may also have a level of operation in South Africa. They are usually 
foreign citizens or South Africans who have settled abroad. They purchase mainly 
from Level Four and sometimes Level Three operatives in South Africa, and usually 
sell their product to foreign refineries. These illegal international buyers also use the 
springboard technique and influence high-level law enforcement personnel. They 
operate on a large scale, purchasing and/or selling high volumes of stolen products, 
and also assist South African Level Four suppliers to launder the proceeds of the 
transactions through so-called “currency movers” (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:82). 
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3.8.2 Level Four: Illegal national operatives 
Venter (2006) alluded that Illegal national buyers are based in South Africa, but they 
mostly sell their products on the international market – mostly refineries or Level Five 
operatives operating in foreign countries. They sometimes use other African 
countries as a springboard to export their stolen product to buyers on the European 
market (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:82). They operate at a high level of sophistication, 
given the high volume of product they turn over and the high prices paid on the 
international market. These operatives also enjoy a high standard of living and have 
a substantial asset base. It is common for these operatives to have both local and 
overseas bank accounts and they often hold assets in the names of third parties. 
 
They use various forms of money laundering schemes to enable them to clean the 
proceeds of their illegal business and to maintain their high standard of living in 
South Africa. Like Level Three operative they only conduct business with selected 
people such as mine employees and SAPS, and do not commonly participate in that 
part of the business that carries a high degree of risk. They also contact and 
influence law-enforcement agencies at a high level and this make it particularly 
difficult to investigate Level Four operatives successfully (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:82).  
 
3.8.3 Level Three: Illegal regional operatives 
These operatives maintain permanent contact with the Level Two operatives and 
turn over stolen products on a daily basis with large amounts of cash resources on 
hand to facilitate their activities. The Level Three operatives will receive stolen PGMs 
from the level two, illegal buyers, or level one, mine employee operatives, on a daily 
basis – and accumulate large amounts of stolen product before despatching to level 
four, illegal national operatives, in exchange for money.  
 
Millions of rand are made available by syndicates to obtain the stolen products and 
also to corrupt and encourage mine employees and others to assume the risk and 
participate in the enterprise (Venter, 2006). The Level Three operatives are regional 
buyers situated in South Africa, and mainly operate from the Gauteng and 
Rustenburg areas. They operate at a high level of sophistication and maintain high-
level contact in SAPS and other institutions. They rely on assays of the product for 
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business purposes and will often use selected laboratories for this purpose (Venter, 
2006).  
 
Level 3 operatives rely on others to do the actual work and to assume the risk – and 
will seldom be in possession of the unwrought precious metal. The Level Three 
operatives build up a substantial asset base and may have overseas bank accounts 
– often in the name of third parties. These operatives reap the rewards of large 
volumes of stolen product and sell to higher levels (level four and five) or even local 
refineries and jewellers (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:82). 
 
3.8.4 Level Two: Runners and illegal smelt houses 
They mostly operate in specific regions where the producers are situated and have 
permanent networks in place. They communicate with the members of Level One 
and remove the product as soon as it becomes available. They are also responsible 
for the corruption of the Level One operatives and establish and maintain corrupt 
contacts within the SAPS to ensure the smooth running of their operations (Venter, 
2006). These operatives are also involved in the smelting of stolen products through 
illegal smelting houses. They also put the product together in larger quantities and 
sell some to the different Level Three operatives or sometimes directly to the Level 
Four operatives (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:82). 
 
3.8.5 Level One: Employee’s operatives 
These operatives steal at source – which is mostly at the mines themselves. Mine 
and refinery employees individually or in groups are mostly involved at this level and 
their activities are facilitated by the huge amounts spent by the syndicates on 
corrupting officials and the breaching of security systems (Coetzee & Horn, 
2007:82). 
 
In the court case: National Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Naidoo and others, 
(2006), it was stated that in 1999 investigations commenced into the national and 
international smuggling arena and evidence was collected about the individuals and 
criminal syndicates operating and trading in stolen unwrought precious metals in an 
organised manner, and on an international basis. The project was planned as a long-
term investigation, aimed at securing evidence to support a successful prosecution 
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against identified suspects involved in the illicit PGM market. The investigations were 
conducted into the affairs of persons and or entities who, nationally and 
internationally, were involved in the theft and marketing of PGMs (Anon, [sa]).  
 
It was established in the above case that the theft and sale of the stolen product, in 
whatever form, is committed in a syndicate-driven environment. Investigations clearly 
indicated five distinguishable levels (as outlined above) in the hierarchy of this type 
of syndicated driven crime – which had been identified by law-enforcement agencies 
operating in this field. The five levels of organised crime syndicates involved in the 
theft of PGMs were identified during the Project Yield investigations (Anon, [sa]). To 
counter this theft of PGMs, a dedicated investigating and prosecuting capacity was 
established by the then Directorate for Special Operations (DSO) of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and of the South African Police Services (SAPS) – 
under the project codename Project Yield – to deal with the crime focus area, 
namely the theft of precious metals from mines in South Africa (Anon, [sa]). 
 
In the case of Sidumo and other vs. Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd. and others 
(2007), Mr Sidumo was dismissed from the company’s employ for negligently failing 
to apply established and detailed individual search procedures, which were 
significantly different from the random search procedures followed in his earlier post 
– prior to his transfer to the Redressing Section. The new more rigorous search 
procedures had been instituted as part of the overall effort to minimise losses due, 
inter alia, to theft. The dismissal followed the holding of an internal disciplinary 
inquiry and an internal appeal (which was turned down with the outcome of the 
internal hearing being upheld). Subsequently, Mr Sidumo referred an unfair dismissal 
dispute to the CCMA in terms of Section 191 (1) (a) of the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA). 
 
Conciliation failed and the matter was referred to arbitration. The third respondent, 
CCMA arbitrator, found Mr Sidumo guilty of misconduct, but held that dismissal was 
not an appropriate or fair sanction. Mr Sidumo was reinstated with three months’ 
compensation subject to a written warning valid for three months. The mine applied 
to the Labour Court of Appeal, but their appeal action was dismissed with costs. The 
mine then referred the matter to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the decision of 
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the Labour Court of Appeal was overturned and substituted with a determination that 
the dismissal was fair and should therefore be implemented (Anon, 2007). 
 
From the above case law, it was established that the theft of company assets is 
committed by the syndicates due to the negligence and complacency of the security 
officer for failing to conduct a detailed individual body search procedure on 
employees and contractors to prevent any loss for the company. The action of the 
security officer is significant in the sense that he/she needs to ensure that company 
assets are always protected from the crime syndicates that operates in the company. 
In accordance with the hierarchy of the type of syndicate crime level, the security 
officer is categorised as Level One operative. The company has instituted a new 
more rigorous search procedure as part of the overall effort to minimise losses due 
to theft and that particular security officer failed to comply with the search procedure 
as required by the company. The company instituted disciplinary actions against the 
employee for failing to comply with the search procedure standard. 
 
In the case of Maphisa v Impala Platinum Refinery and others (2015), Mr Maphisa 
was dismissed for being an accomplice to an attempted theft of PGMs. The 
dismissal followed on an internal disciplinary inquiry and on an internal appeal. 
Subsequent to that, Mr Maphisa referred the dispute to the CCMA in terms of 
Section 191 (1) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) for an unfair dismissal. The matter 
was referred to mediation and arbitration.  
 
The first respondent, CCMA arbitrator found that the dismissal was substantively 
unfair and reinstated Mr Maphisa. The refinery applied to the labour court of appeal 
and the arbitration award was reviewed. The labour court judgement overturned the 
decision by the commissioner and set aside the arbitration award. The labour court 
ruled that the dismissal of Mr Maphisa was substantively fair.  
 
It was established from the above case that Mr Maphisa, an Impala employee was 
involved in the theft of PGMs and he was colluding with other contractors (KMA 
Workforce, LADS Construction and Bidvest Protea Coin) to commit such a crime. In 
terms of the hierarchy of crime syndicate, the employee is regarded as Level One 
operative as he steals from the source (Refinery). This case indicates that the 
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employees in the refinery do not work alone but operates in a syndicate – driven 
environment and exploit the contractors to achieve their ultimate goals of enriching 
themselves through the company assets (PGMs). To confirm the involvement of the 
employee (Mr Maphisa), the labour court ruled in favour of the refinery and the 
employee was dismissed. 
 
3.9 THE SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL 
In order for any organisation (e.g. Impala Platinum) facing challenges with regard to 
crime risk (theft), it is recommended that such organisations follow a security risk 
management process, in order to reduce that specific crime risk (Rogers, 2005:v). 
 
Rogers (2008:152) originally outlined eleven components of the security risk 
management model (all are of relevance to this study). The model has a cyclic 
approach with various components that can be implemented by any organisation (for 
example, Impala Platinum) in terms of policies, procedures and security measures. 
According to Rogers (2008:152), the components cannot be viewed in isolation – but 
should be approached as comprising sub-components of an integrated whole, since 
they are linked and inter-dependent upon each other. Although security measures 
are in place at Impala Platinum refinery, crime syndicates will always have some 
means to bypass the security systems, and the model will help to improve the 
existing security measures so that they become more effective (Rogers, 2005:v). 
 
Figure 3.2 (below) outlines various components of the security risk management 
model. The discussion of the various components of the model start from step 1 
(Factors Causing Crime) of the diagram and work through to the last step 
(Implementation and Evaluation of Security Measures) of the components. 
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Figure 3.2:  The UNISA Security Risk Management Model 
 
 
 STEP 1 
Factors Causing Crime 
   
 STEP 2 
The Security Policy 
   
 STEP 3 
The Preliminary Security Survey 
   
 
STEP 4 
The Risk Analysis 
THE SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
MODEL 
  
STEP 5 
The Security Survey 
   
STEP 6 
The Security Risk Control Measures 
   
 STEP 7 
Return on Investment 
   
 STEP 8 
The Security Risk Management Report 
   
 STEP 9 
Implementation and evaluation of 
security measures 
 
(Rogers, 2005 & 2008: 152; Adapted by Olckers, 2007 & by Kole, 2010). 
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This model was adapted by Olckers (2007) and by Kole (2010) – with the addition of 
two components, namely: maintenance and upgrade (Olckers); and service level 
agreement (Kole). 
 
According to Rogers and Schoeman (2009:45), a change in any of the components 
will have a negative impact on the other components. For example, “in a case where 
the risk increases, the risk automatically has a negative impact on the security 
measures, which have to be improved in managing crime risk. There will be cost 
implications and policy changes on the part of the organisation may result” (Rogers 
& Schoeman, 2009:45).  
 
3.10 ANALYSIS OF METHOD OF PROTECTION 
During the site visit at the Impala mines and refinery, as part of on-site orientation, 
the researcher compiled a security survey checklist to assist with the process survey. 
 
The table below was utilised by the researcher during the site visit and it illustrate the 
PGMs that are produced in the refinery, the location of the PMR in the refinery and 
the security measures in place in the refinery. All the security measures were 
analysed to identify the vulnerabilities and shortcomings in the refinery. 
 
Table 3.1 below was used during the site visit at Impala Platinum Refinery 
 
Table 3.1:  Impala site Audit Survey Checklist 
 
CONTROL ISSUE YES NO COMMENTS 
A TYPE OF PRODUCT    
1. Platinum    
2. Rhodium    
3. Palladium & Other    
B LOCATION    
1. PMR    
2. BMR    
3. OTHER    
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C SECURITY MEASURES    
1. Human Resources    
2. Control Room    
3. CCTV Surveillance    
4. Alarm Systems    
5. Turnstiles    
6. Search Cubicles    
7. Interlocking doors    
8. Metal detectors    
9. Policies & Procedures    
10. Security awareness    
11. Burglar proofing on windows    
12. Security gates    
13. Adequate lighting    
TOTAL YES ANSWERS    
TOTAL NO ANSWERS    
SECURITY WEAKNESS    
 
With permission being granted by the company (see appendices as Annexure I) to 
undertake the research study, the following were observed by the researcher during 
the site audit. 
 
From what was observed, it became more apparent to the researcher that despite 
the security measures in place, theft of PGMs at Impala occurred in most instances 
and that should be a concern to the management at the refinery. 
 
3.10.1 Type of product 
Although the Rhodium price fluctuates to be greater than the Platinum price, crime 
syndicates focus more on theft of Platinum. Platinum is the primary product at Impala 
Platinum refinery and is more in demand by the underworld market. The Platinum 
underworld market is easily accessible and crime syndicates (Regional, National and 
International levels) outside Impala concentrate on Platinum in most instances. The 
employees, contractors and security officers (level one operatives) in the refinery are 
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well aware that PGMs (Platinum) is more in demand and it is easily smuggled from 
the refinery to the underworld crime syndicates (levels two – five). 
 
3.10.2 Human resource 
There are well trained security officers deployed at Impala Platinum refinery. The 
refinery has outsourced security service provider, Bidvest Protea Coin Security 
Services to render essential services and to protect the assets of the company, 
premises, and employees. The company provides security services at the refinery 
and has deployed 160 security officers including administration staff. The security 
officers had to conduct detail individual search procedures on employees (Impala), 
contractors (KMA Workforce and Lads Construction) and security officers (Bidvest 
Protea Coin) on exiting through the search lanes and cubicles. They also perform 
patrol duties, escort PGMs to OR Tambo airport, conduct investigations, access 
control and monitoring of CCTV surveillance cameras. 
 
3.10.3 Control room 
There are two control rooms situated at the refinery are manned 24/7 by security 
officers. The security officers work under the supervision of Senior Shift Supervisors 
(SSS) in a shift. The duties of a security officer include to monitor CCTV cameras 
and report any criminal activities that will be observed to the management for further 
investigation purposes. The security officers also monitored the tracking devices on 
the transportation of the PGMs to OR Tambo airport. The officers have to ensure 
that all cameras within the refinery are in working condition. Any damages or broken 
cameras have to be reported immediately to be repaired. There is also a Third Tier 
(control room) which oversees the two control rooms to ensure the effective 
monitoring of CCTV cameras and is manned by 24/7. 
 
3.10.4 CCTV surveillance 
There are more than 500 CCTV surveillance cameras installed that cover strategic 
and high risk areas in the refinery. There are also CCTV surveillance cameras inside 
the search cubicle and all these cameras are monitored from the two control rooms. 
There is a Third Tier (Control room) which oversees both control rooms to ensure 
that CCTV surveillance cameras are effectively monitored. The CCTV surveillance 
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cameras footages are also used for the investigations purposes during internal 
disciplinary enquiries and for the court cases purposes. 
 
3.10.5 Alarm system 
All domains in the refinery, where the product is produced and kept in a locked 
place, have an alarm intrusion system. The alarm systems are integrated into the 
control rooms and monitored from them, whenever an alarm is activated, it alerts the 
control room in case an intruder disarms the system and/or if someone is entering 
the area without been noticed. The security officer will then inform relevant 
stakeholders for the necessary action. 
 
3.10.6 Access control 
There are turnstiles in most areas in the refinery where one has to swipe his/her 
access card before entering or exiting the area. The refinery has used access cards 
(proximity cards) to employees, contractors and security officers to access area of 
work, to identify its employees as well as the contractors (KMA Workforce, LADS 
construction and Bidvest Protea Coin) and those access cards are also used to 
report on/off duty. The person issued with the card is responsible for it and it should 
be kept in his/her possession at all times. 
 
3.10.7 Search cubicles 
The search cubicles are confine spaces which accommodates two people, the 
security officer who conducts the search and the person who is being searched. The 
search cubicles are under constant CCTV surveillance cameras and are monitored 
in the control rooms. There is also audio transmission system to listen to the 
conversations of the people inside the search cubicles. 
 
3.10.8 Metal detectors 
Metal detectors are used by security officers to conduct non-physical body searches 
on employees, contractors and security officers exiting the refinery. The purpose of 
the use of the metal detector is to detect foreign objects inside the bodies of 
employees, contractors and security officers exiting through the search cubicles. 
When searches are conducted, the metal detector is switched on and a green light 
illuminates indicating that the metal detector is operational. Whenever a metal 
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detector activates, a red light illuminates with a sound and that will be an indication 
of a foreign object being detected inside the body of an individual. 
 
3.10.9 Policies and procedures 
Policies and procedures are in place as operating guidelines. They form part of a 
comprehensive security plan which security officers need to implement, manage and 
monitor while ensuring that employees and contractors comply with them. 
Procedures and policies serve as a guideline to security officers on how to conduct a 
detailed individual search on employees and contractors. 
 
3.10.10 Security awareness 
It is part of pro-active measures in dealing with crime at the workplace. Security 
awareness flyers are being distributed by the security department as part of pro-
active measures amongst the employees and contractors, to inform them about 
setbacks of crime in general and also about the theft of PGMs in the company. 
Security awareness such as security induction is used to inform the employees and 
contractors regarding consequences of being involved in criminal activities and that 
any PGMs found in the refinery has to be reported to security for further 
investigations. 
 
3.11 ANALYSIS OF IMPALA MINES CASE DOCKETS 
During site visit, the researcher perused 120 case dockets with the intention of 
determining the criminological investigations and to have an insight into the theft of 
PGMs, hoe the cases were investigated, how the case dockets were closed, what 
information was provided on the nature and circumstances of the crime, the profiles 
of the perpetrators, actions taken against the offenders (departmental enquiries and 
criminal courts). 
 
From the analysis observed, the researcher established that all relevant information 
about the theft of PGMs and the basic facts and demographic information regarding 
the incident, statements of witnesses, statement of the suspect, details of the 
suspect, details undertaken by the security investigator dealing with case, progress 
of the disciplinary actions and the progress of the case through the criminal justice 
system were contained in the case dockets. The researcher established that case 
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dockets inspection is conducted on monthly basis as well as prior court appearances 
and after court appearances. All case dockets that are finalised at the court are 
closed and filed.  
 
The court outcome, as well as the disciplinary actions instituted of each and every 
case, are indicated on the outside of the case dockets by the investigator and the 
investigations manager will close the docket thereafter for filing purposes. The 
refinery case dockets information is exactly the same as the SAPS case dockets 
pertaining to the details of the suspect, information on crime, place, time and diary 
section where the investigator record all the activities undertaken during 
investigations. 
 
3.12 ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT REPORTS AT IMPALA PLATINUM MINES 
The crime statistics obtained from Impala Platinum mines and refinery illustrates that 
a total of 75 kilograms of PGMs were recovered for the period 2004-2014 (eleven 
years) – where suspects could not be detected (Anon, 2014). The total value of 
these recovered PGMs was R13 904 000, and indicates that Impala incurs millions 
of rand in losses as a result of theft of PGMs, even though the product is insured. 
The Precious Metal Refinery (PMR) Plant is the vulnerable location where most 
PGMs theft occurs (Anon, 2014).  
 
The following tables and figures list statistics obtained by the researcher during the 
study with regard to recoveries of PGMs at Impala Platinum mines and refinery 
without suspects being arrested; recoveries of PGMs with suspects being arrested; 
the value of PGMs stolen and recovered; cases reported and investigated by Impala 
Platinum, as well as the total number of suspects arrested. 
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Table 3.2:  Impala Platinum mines and refinery statistics of recovered PGMs 
(January 2004-December 2014) 
 
YEAR MASS (KG) VALUE (R) LOCATION 
2004 5.4 900 000 PMR 
2005 5 842 000 PMR 
2006 5.1 894 000 PMR 
2007 5.9 1 000 000 PMR 
2008 5.5 928 000 PMR 
2009 11 2 000 000 PMR 
2010 11.1 2 110 000 PMR 
2011 6.5 1 300 000 PMR 
2012 6 1 000 000 PMR 
2013 6.18 1 280 000 PMR 
2014 7 1 560 000 PMR 
TOTAL 75 13 904 000  
PMR = Platinum Metals Refinery, Springs 
(Impala Incident Report, 2004-2014) 
 
According to Table 3.2 (above), in 2009 and 2010, more PGMs were recovered than 
any of the other years under review. The value for 2009 and 2010 is estimated at R4 
110 000. The value of the PGMs recovered in 2010 is greater than any of the other 
years under review, and amounts to R2 110 000. The total value of PGMs recovered 
where suspects were not detected and arrested amounts to R13 904 000. The 
location where PGMs were recovered is at the PMR Plant at Impala Platinum 
Refinery in Springs, Gauteng Province, and may indicate that employees, 
contractors and security personnel working at the PMR Plant are the ones involved 
in the theft of PGMs. The PGMs were recovered hidden in different place in the PMR 
refinery. 
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Table 3.3:  Impala Platinum mines and refinery statistics of recovered PGMs 
with number of suspects (January 2004-December 2014) 
 
YEAR MASS (KG) VALUE (R) LOCATION SUSPECTS 
2004 8 1 380 000 PMR 19 
2005 9 1 400 000 PMR 12 
2006 13 2 300 000 PMR 18 
2007 11 2 050 000 PMR 15 
2008 7 1 350 000 PMR 11 
2009 12 2 200 000 PMR 17 
2010 11.8 2 140 000 PMR 16 
2011 14.5 2 910 000 PMR 21 
2012 10.6 1 570 000 PMR 18 
2013 15.8 3 122 222 PMR 17 
2014 10 2 100 000 PMR 15 
TOTAL 123 22 522 222  179 
 (Impala PGMs Reports, 2004-2014) 
 
Table 3.3 (above) indicates that in 2011, 21 suspects were arrested for theft and 
14.5 kg of PGMS were recovered from the suspects. During 2011, the most PGMs 
were recovered and there were more suspects, bigger masses (15.8 kg) and values 
(R3 122 222 in values) – compared to other years during the period 2004-2014. In 
terms of PGMs recovered, 2010 follows with 14.5 kg, valued R2 910 000. In terms of 
suspects arrested the year 2004 follows with 19 suspects arrested. The total number 
of suspects arrested for the period 2004-2014 is 179, and the total amount of PGMs 
recovered was 123 kg, with its total value being R22 522 222. Thus Impala incurs 
millions of rand in losses as a result of employees, security officers and contractors 
who are involved in criminal activities.  
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Table 3.4:  Cases reported and investigated by Impala Platinum investigators 
for theft of PGMs with number of suspects (January 2004-
December 2014)  
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
18 22 14 26 30 35 38 30 29 17 15 
(Impala Cases Report, 2004-2014) 
 
The most cases of theft of PGMs reported were in 2010 – where 38 cases were 
investigated with no trace of the suspects involved followed by 2009 – where 35 
cases were investigated. The fewest cases reported were in 2006 (total of 14). 
During the period 2004-2014, a total of 274 cases were reported and investigated by 
the investigation department of Impala Protection Services.  
 
Table 3.5:  Reported cases where employees, contractors and security 
officers were involved in the theft of PGMs (January 2004- 
December 2014) 
 
EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS SECURITY OFFICERS 
82 71 26 
(Impala Suspects Report, 2004-2014) 
 
Table 3.5 (above) illustrates the cases reported where employees, contractors and 
security officers were involved in the theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum mines and 
refinery – for the period 2004 to 2014. The total number of employees arrested was 
82 – with 71 contractors and 26 security officers also arrested. This indicates that 
theft is committed by the people working at Impala Platinum mines and refinery. The 
total number of people arrested for theft of PGMs – for the period 2004 to 2014 was 
179. 
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Figure 3.3:  Total value (Rand) of PGMs recovered by Impala Platinum  
(2004-2014) 
 
 
 (Impala Number of Suspects Reports, 2004-2014). 
 
Figure 3.3 (above) illustrates the value in the recovery of PGMs from 2004 to 2014. 
According to the figures, 2010 was the year when most PGMs were recovered (total 
value of R2 110 000), followed by 2009 (total value of R2 000 000). The year 2005 
had the least recovery of PGMs (total value of R842 000). The years 2007 and 2012 
were the same in terms of recoveries – each with a total value of R1 000 000. 
 
Figure 3.4:  Total value (Rand) of PGMs recovered by Impala Platinum where 
suspects arrested (2004–2014) 
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Figure 3.4 (above) indicates the total value of PGMs recovered where suspects were 
arrested from 2004-2014. According to the figures as illustrated, 2013 was the year 
with the greatest value (R3 122 222) where PGMs were recovered, followed by 2011 
(total value of (R2 910 000). The PGMs were recovered from the suspects during 
arrests and were found in possession of them. Between the year 2004-2014, the 
total value of PGMs recovered was R22 522 222. The year 2008 had the least 
recovery of PGMs (total value R1 350 000). 
 
Figure 3.5:  Total number of cases investigated by Impala Platinum  
(2004-2014) 
 
 (Impala Case Reports, 2004-2014). 
 
According to Figure 3.5 (above), the highest number of cases investigated by Impala 
Platinum was in 2010 – with total of 38 case dockets. This total is followed by the 
year 2009 with 35 case dockets. The least cases investigated were in 2006 – with a 
total of only 14. The total cases investigated from 2004-2014 were 274. 
 
3.13 ORGANISED CRIME SYNDICATES INVOLVED IN THE THEFT OF PGMs 
AT IMPALA PLATINUM MINES 
According to statistics from Impala Platinum, most people involved in the theft of 
PGMs are employees who have access to the product in the PMR plant. They act on 
their own, individually or in groups to get hold of the product from the place of origin. 
Only the Process Controllers who are ensuring the process, are predictable, stable 
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and consistently operating at the target level of performance with only some normal 
variation – deal directly with the product.  
 
The employees also involve contractors from KMA Workforce, Lads Construction 
and Bidvest Protea Coin in the theft of the platinum at the refinery. Some of the 
contractors employed by companies (KMA Workforce, Lads Construction and 
Bidvest Protea Coin) at the refinery are used by the employees (process controllers) 
to remove PGMs from the plant, through the security system – i.e. searches. The 
employees would remove the PGMs from the place of origin in the refinery, hand it 
over to the contractor, who will then conceal it and take it through the searches 
(Anon, 2013). The Security Officers on duty would collude with both employees and 
contractors (KMA Workforce, Lads Construction and Bidvest Protea Coin) to steal 
the PGMs from the refinery. This collusion involved the non-implementation of 
conducting detailed individual search procedures. These search procedures are part 
of the overall efforts to minimise losses due to, among other things, theft from the 
company premises (Anon, 2013).  
 
The security officers would also receive quantities of PGMs already made up in 
parcels for removal from the PMR plant employees. The security officers then 
conceal it (see below the detailed exposition of the methods used by them for 
concealment and smuggling out) and remove it from the PMR plant – all without 
being properly searched. The security officer deployed at the searches will arrange 
with another security officer who would be in possession of PGMs to be searched by 
that specific officer – and the detailed individual search procedure will not be 
adhered to by the two in collusion with the primary thief, and the rest of the 
organised syndicate. The Security Officer with the concealed PGMs would then be 
able to go through the search area without the PGMs being detected (Anon, 2013).  
 
These organised crime syndicate activities are facilitated by huge amounts of money 
spent by the syndicates on corrupting officials (SAPS) and the breaching of security 
systems (Coetzee & Horn, 2007: 34). The crime syndicates would pay the SAPS 
members huge amount of money in favour of not being arrested for the unlawful 
activities and in smuggling in PGMs. The PGMs would then be sold to the level two, 
i.e. illegal buyers and runner operatives, who operate in specific areas where 
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producers are situated and have permanent networks in place. The Level Two 
operatives are also involved in the smelting of stolen product through illegal smelting 
houses (Coetzee & Horn, 2007:81). 
 
The PGMs that are stolen by the employees and/or security officers are stolen in 
small quantities (grams). The stolen product would be placed in a sample plastic bag 
and masking tape would be used to make up a rectum parcel – as illustrated in the 
image below – or placed in surgical gloves as illustrated in Image 3.2 (Anon, 2013).  
 
Image 3.1:  Format 1 of rectum parcels containing PGMs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rectum parcel recovered from a suspect after being arrested – salt format (Impala 
Platinum, 2006) 
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Image 3.2:  Format 2 of rectum parcels containing PGMs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rectum parcel recovered from suspect after arrest – salt format (Impala Platinum, 
2010). 
 
The images above indicate one of the methods used when PGMs are removed from 
the plant by employees and/or security officers. The syndicates’ members conceal 
the product inside their bodies – knowing that the metal detectors are ineffective and 
do not pick-up the parcels as it contains salts and not metals. The metal detectors 
only activates on metals detected during searches. The above images illustrate the 
typical rectum parcel and the manner in which it is used to remove PGMs from the 
place of origin by the crime syndicates in a salt form (a yellow substance). This 
manner of theft is effective for the syndicates, since it cannot be easily detected. It is 
the technique used in most cases as it is the easiest way to remove the product from 
the plant – and it is not easily detected by the metal detector. 
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Image 3.3:  Format 3: Surgical gloves containing PGMs 
 
Recovered PGMS in surgical gloves concealed in underwear of suspect, after arrest 
– salt format (Impala Platinum, 2006). 
 
The photo above indicates the manner in which employees, contractors and security 
officers remove the PGMs from the PMR plant. The syndicates use disposable 
surgical gloves – which are normally used during medical examinations and 
procedures. They pack PGMs inside, and conceal them under their bodies between 
their legs in salt form (yellow substance), or metal form. The photo illustrates 
platinum salt which is the easiest product to steal from the refinery process. This was 
recovered from the suspect after a medical X-ray was taken by the personnel at the 
refinery clinic (Anon, 2013).  
 
  
61 
©University of South Africa 2016 
Image 3.4: Recovered format of rectum parcels containing PGMs 
 
 
 
Recovered PGMs in a rectum format from a suspect on exiting the refinery (Impala, 
2013). 
 
The image (above) illustrates the modus operandi of crime syndicates at the refinery 
(level one operatives), the rectum parcels wrapped with an insulation tape. The 
crime syndicates will place the material in a sample plastic bag and use the 
insulation tape to wrap the material in a rectum format. The PGMs wrapped in an 
insulation tape are in a salt format and the metal detector cannot activate when used 
to do a detailed individual search on a person. 
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Image 3.5:  Recovered surgical gloves rectum parcels containing PGMs 
 
 
 
Recovered PGMs found hidden inside the refinery (Impala PGMs Report, 2013) 
 
The image (above) reflects the manner in which PGMs are removed from the 
refinery by the syndicates. The syndicates hide the material between their legs and 
this makes it difficult for a metal detector to can detect the parcels as it is in a salt 
format. The syndicates are aware that the metal detector does not activate if the 
parcel is in a salt format unless the parcel is in a metal format it is when the metal 
detector will activate. The collusion between the employees, contractors and security 
officers could be the reason for them to know about the ineffectiveness of the metal 
detector. 
 
The security officer will utilise the metal detector, a device which responds to metal 
at a distance, to conduct a detailed individual search procedure to ensure that the 
individual is free from PGMs or not in possession of them. When a metal detector 
activates during the search on an individual, he or she will be taken to the Impala 
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Medical Clinic at the refinery for a medical X-ray – to establish if the individual is in 
possession of PGMs (Anon, 2013). The second method used is surgical gloves 
(placement of the PGMs in the surgical gloves). The search area has a search 
cubicle where only one security officer and the individual enter – for the search to be 
conducted in private. 
 
Image 3.6:  Type of metal detectors used by security officers 
 
 
Example of metal detectors usually used to conduct detailed, individual search 
procedures (Impala Platinum, 2006). 
 
The above image illustrates the type of metal detectors used by the security officers 
when conducting detailed, individual search procedure. The metal detectors are not 
that effective and cannot easily detect PGMs in a salt form (yellow substance), since 
the salt does not contain metal. However, the syndicate member’s body language 
might suggest suspicious activity. 
 
Metal detectors use an electromagnetic field to detect any foreign object in the 
person’s body. The metal detectors used by Impala Platinum refinery are ineffective 
in detecting foreign objects (PGMs) inside the person’s body (it does not contain 
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metal) and cannot be activated if someone is in possession of PGMs as it cannot 
detect PGMs in salt form (yellow substance does not contain metal). 
 
Since the employees at Impala Platinum mine and refinery are involved with crime 
syndicates in terms of the theft of PGMs, it is appropriate to use investigation 
methods such as surveillance to constantly and intensively monitor the suspects, 
and to use an agent or informer to infiltrate the syndicate to gather evidence and 
information and/or to penetrate the syndicate by recruiting members from the 
syndicate to investigate employees and organised crime syndicates. Du Preez 
(1996:1) defines investigation of crime as being “a systematised search for the truth, 
with the primary purpose of finding a positive solution to the crime with the help of 
objective and subjective clues”. According to Van der Westhuizen (1996:4), 
investigation takes place with definite objectives, which describe a commitment that 
must be achieved within an appointed time, and keeping a specified standard in 
mind. 
 
The objectives of investigation are identification of the crime, gathering of evidence, 
individualisation of the crime, arresting of the suspects, recovery of stolen property, 
and involvement in the prosecution process (Van der Westhuizen, 1996:4). The theft 
of PGMs tends to occur above ground during one of the recovery processes in the 
refinery. Impala Platinum mines and refinery have four complicated recovery 
processes for PGMs (Anon, 2013).  
 
3.14 CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused primarily on a general outline of the theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs) in South Africa – in particular in the mining producing industry. It 
dealt with the extent of theft of PGMs, the security RISK MANAGEMENT model that 
can be applied by Impala Platinum to enhance the fight against the crime, the 
organised crime threats, PMR processes, complicated recovery processes of PGMs, 
analysis of incident reports at Impala Platinum, criminal investigation techniques that 
can be used by Impala Platinum to investigate theft of PGMs, the role of PGMs in 
South Africa, and the organised crime syndicates involved in the theft in South 
Africa. The modus operandi of crime syndicates was also discussed. It is evident that 
although there are security measures in place, those measures are not effective 
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enough to prevent or reduce the incidence of the theft of PGMs. It is obvious that an 
improvement in the existing security measures is needed to ensure better protection 
of PGMs and greater prevention of their theft, as an identified risk, as well as a threat 
to the future operations and profitability of mining it. 
 
Chapter 4 will deal with interpretation of data collected, the discussion thereof, 
analysis and comparison of research findings – with the purpose of making 
recommendations to enable the researcher to achieve the objectives and goals of 
the research study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION, INTERPRETATION AND COMPARISON  
OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, data were collected by utilising three separate questionnaires for 
Security Managers, Security Investigators and Security Officers – as well as one-on-
one interviews with employees and contractors. The collected data were collated and 
analysed. A site visit was also conducted and during site visit, the researcher 
perused case dockets by making use of a case docket pro-forma analysis sheet. 
This chapter presents the findings of the research, in accordance with the 
methodologies applied – as mentioned in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the collected 
information will be interpreted, discussed and compared. This will be done with a 
view to making recommendations based on the aims and objectives of the research 
study. 
 
4.2 INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.2.1 Security managers’ questionnaires 
Biographical Details 
a) Gender 
A total of 10 Security Managers responded to the questionnaires. All the 
respondents (100%) were male. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear from the respondents that males occupy managerial positions, and women 
are not considered for such managerial positions. The disparity of gender equity in 
the mining industry is due to the fact that in the past, females were not employed in 
the security environment but rather in an administration environment. The 
managerial positions in the security environment are mostly offered to people who 
are more experienced (i.e. long-serving males) in the security industry.  
 
b) Age 
In terms of age, all respondents were 35 to 50 (100%). This is an indication of the 
age group of all respondents. 
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Deduction: 
All the Security Managers were between 35 and 50. None of the respondents were 
younger than 35 years and it is an indication that younger Security Managers are 
considered to be too inexperienced to occupy managerial positions in the security 
industry – because of the associated responsibilities as well as being accountable. 
For example: a younger manager (34 and below), would find himself managing 
people who are older than himself, resulting in an uncomfortable or awkward 
scenario to cope with. The manager has to give instructions and guidance to his 
subordinates, and for the younger manager it might be a difficult situation and he 
may encounter resistance. 
c) Race 
In terms of race, all (100%) respondents were white. 
 
Deduction: 
Managerial positions are occupied and dominated by whites only in the mining 
industry – in particular in Impala Platinum mines and refinery. It is clear that 
employment equity has not yet being complied with and it would also appear that 
experience in the field was prioritised above any other requirements. In terms of the 
employment equity, previously disadvantages people has to occupy 75 per cent of 
the managerial positions across the spectrum than the white counterparts. 
 
d) Marital Status 
In terms of marital status, all (100%) respondents were married with families. 
 
Deduction: 
It can be concluded that all the respondents had wives and children. They are 
classified as family men with family responsibilities. Seven of the respondents had 
two dependents and three respondents had one dependant each. When taking into 
consideration the age group (35 and older) of the respondents, it is a distinct 
possibility that at their age, they would be married with children. 
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e) Highest Educational Qualification 
In terms of highest educational qualification, five (50%) respondents had Standard 
10/Grade 12 and five (50%) had a three-year diploma/degree. 
 
Deduction: 
Of all the respondents, five had attained Grade 12 as their highest educational 
qualification. However, five had a three year diploma/degree. The five respondents 
that attained tertiary qualifications ranged from a Diploma in Policing/Security 
Management to a BTech degree in security management and/or policing. The 
respondents with standard 10/grade 12 are more experienced than the ones with 
diploma/degree and have long time service in security environment. It would appear 
that a tertiary qualification is not an absolute prerequisite for the managerial position 
– but rather management experience. Some of the respondents with standard 
10/Grade 12 indicated that they had attained security management certificate short 
course (Short Learning Programme (SLP) through UNISA, which it is not deemed as 
a formal accredited tertiary qualification. 
 
Crime trends 
a)  In-house security or service provider 
In terms of the in-house security or service provider, five (50%) managers are in-
house security and five (50%) managers are the service provider. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear that managerial positions are occupied by the in-house security as well as 
the service provider (Bidvest Protea Coin). The service provider provides security 
services that entails security managers, security officers and investigators. The 
service provider employed 160 members including administration staff and has been 
the service provider for the past 18 years. The in-house security oversees that the 
service level agreement is complied with and give assistance whenever needed. The 
service provider management reports to the Group Protection Services Manager at 
Impala Platinum. 
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b) Prevalence theft of PGMs 
All (100%) respondents agreed that theft of PGMs was experienced by Impala 
Platinum. 
 
Deduction: 
The respondents also agreed that theft of PGMs was committed by employees, 
contractors and security officers (Level one operatives). According to the 
respondents, there is a dedicated investigations team that deals with the theft of 
PGMs. From the responses it is clear that the respondents had different opinions in 
terms of syndicates operating in the refinery, as well as the involvement of 
management with regards to theft. They indicated that money is a major contributing 
factor to the theft of PGMs. The respondents further indicated that theft of PGMs is 
the main problem experienced at the refinery. 
 
c) Theft of PGMs, a challenge to mining industry 
In terms of challenge, all (100%) respondents stated that theft of PGMs is a 
challenge to the mining industry as a whole including Gold and Diamond mines. 
 
Deduction: 
They agreed that production loss, the modus operandi of criminals, the underworld 
market outside the mining industry, as well as demand of PGMs by national and 
international levels (levels four and five) – are challenges facing the mining industry. 
The chamber of mines and the mining industry has established a Standing 
Committee on Security and they meet regularly to deliberate on challenges facing 
the industry. The SAPS Organised Crime Unit in conjunction with the mining industry 
has also established a Provincial Operational Committee to discuss way forward in 
terms of the theft of PGMs. They all stated that theft of PGMs has a negative impact 
in the mining industry. 
 
d) Relationship with National Prosecuting Authority regarding theft of 
PGMs 
Five (50%) responded by stating there is a good work relationship, three (30%) said 
it was bad and two (20%) did not respond. 
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Deduction: 
Although responses differed, it can be concluded that there was a little co-operation 
from the NPA and the work relationship needs to improve for the betterment of the 
industry and to serve as a deterrent. The success rate in terms of convictions has to 
improve and jail imprisonment has to be imposed, in order to send a strong message 
to the crime syndicates that crime does not pay. The response from the participants 
indicate that the work relationship between the NPA, SAPS and the mining industry 
need to be strong and intact at all times to overcome theft challenges in the mining 
industry. 
 
e) SAPS Organised Crime Unit members’ involvement in corruption 
The respondents all (100%) responded by indicating that some members of the 
SAPS Organised Crime Unit are involved in corruption/criminal activities. 
 
Deduction: 
Form the respondents, it is clear that members of the SAPS Organised Crime Unit 
are involved in corruption and/or illegal activities. It was established that the 
members will conduct a poor investigations which will result in cases being 
withdrawn at the courts, cause the disappearance of case dockets, evidence and 
exhibits, not informing complainants and witnesses regarding trial dates, swap 
exhibits of high value with lower value, and also visit the accused at their places of 
residence to extort money from them. 
 
f) Exportation of stolen product 
In terms of stolen products being exported, they all (100%) agree that the product is 
being exported. 
 
Deduction: 
The respondents all agreed and stated that the stolen material is exported. Four of 
the responded mentioned that Belgium is the destination for the stolen material, 
while other four said that Russia is the most prominent country where the material is 
exported and two said that neighbouring countries Zimbabwe is the country that is 
being used by the syndicate to export the material to the international destination. 
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g) Security awareness programme 
The nine respondents (90%) indicated that security awareness programmes are in 
place – while one (10%) respondent said this was not the case. 
 
Deduction: 
Although one responded negatively, it is clear that security awareness programmes 
are in place and are promoted in different ways such as security induction, monthly 
flyers with regard to crime, as well as policies and procedures. It can be concluded 
that although the majority agrees that security awareness is in place and working, 
the employees and the contractors do not take the awareness into consideration 
when one look at the crime committed and loss the company incurred in the past 11 
years. It would appear that the programme in place is not effective and efficient as 
supposing.  
 
h) Screening of security applicants before employment 
In terms of screening, all (100%) respondents indicated that a screening process is 
always followed. 
 
Deduction: 
They all agreed that a screening process for security applicants is always complied 
with before employment is considered. The applicant’s qualifications and the criminal 
record will be verified through the SAPS. They also agreed that assessment of 
security officials is conducted periodically, every six months. The assessment of 
security officials is done through polygraph tests. In an event that the security officer 
polygraph test indicate deception, such particular officer will be removed from being 
deployed in the refinery. 
 
Security measures 
a) Security measures in place 
In terms of security measures, all (100%) respondents stated that security measures 
are in place. 
 
  
72 
©University of South Africa 2016 
Deduction: 
It is clear from the respondents that security measures such as security fences, 
CCTV cameras, security officers, access control and alarm intrusion systems are in 
place and always in working condition. According to the responses security 
measures in place are effective. CCTV cameras are in operation 24/7, and are 
monitored from the control rooms by nine security members per 12-hour shift. From 
the statistics obtained from the refinery, it is clear that the security measures in place 
are manipulated by the employees, contractors and security officers who are 
involved in the theft of PGMs. It would appear that the collusion between the 
employees, contractors and security officers is working in their favour if one has to 
take into consideration the amount of PGMs being stolen without being detected by 
the security measures in place. 
 
b) Security systems’ maintenance 
In terms of security systems’ maintenance, all (100%) respondents stated that 
security systems are regularly maintained. 
 
Deduction: 
From the respondents, it is clear that they all agree that the maintenance of the 
security system is maintained at all times. The responses indicated that the service 
provider maintain the system regularly, however, eight of the respondents stated that 
maintenance is done on a daily basis, while two stated that maintenance is done on 
a weekly basis. Although the respondents differ on the maintenance schedule, it is 
clear that the security system is maintained at all cost.  
 
c) Security procedures and policies 
In terms of security procedures and policies, all (100%) respondents stated that 
security procedures and policies are in place. 
 
Deduction: 
All respondents stated that security procedures and policies are in place and that 
employees and the security officers are familiar with the contents thereof. Audits are 
done and copies of the procedures and policies are kept at Document Control 
department in the company. The procedures and policies need to be more detailed 
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that will give guidelines to the employees and security officers in terms of the breach 
thereof. From the responses, it would seem that the procedures and policies in place 
are not detailed and they need to be reviewed to enhance effectiveness of them. 
 
4.2.2 Security investigators questionnaires 
Biographical details 
a) Gender 
In terms of gender, twenty (100%) of the participants responded. According to 
gender – 15 were males and five were females. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear that most of the investigators at the refinery are males and they dominate 
in the field of the security investigations. The reason could be that previously, more 
males were employed in the mining industry than females – in particular in the 
Security/Protection Services department. The majority of the investigators were 
previously employed in the SAPS as male detectives as compared to females who 
were previously employed as administration staff while being a police woman. 
 
b) Age 
In terms of age, all (100%) responded and according to age, 15 (75%) were between 
30-50 years and five (25%) were older than 50 years. 
 
Deduction: 
Most of the security investigators were aged 30-50 years. Although five respondents 
were older than 50 years, it indicates that experience plays an important part in a 
work situation. The investigations would need somebody who is mature and ready to 
make/take decisive decisions. It would appear that the respondent’s ages plays an 
important role in the investigations and younger employees might compromise the 
investigations skills in a department in the refinery. 
 
c) Race 
In terms of race, all (100%) respondents were white as the vast majority. 
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Deduction: 
It is clear that there is no racial representation in the refinery and only whites are 
employed as the investigations officers. It could be that experience again is 
considered when deploying officials for investigation purposes. Most of the blacks 
from the service provider and in-house security are deployed as the guards and 
perform patrols duties, monitoring of CCTV cameras and conducting individual 
searches to employees and contractors. 
 
d) Marital Status 
In terms of marital status, 18 (80%) of the investigators were married, one (10%) was 
divorced, and one (10%) was a widow. 
 
Deduction: 
It can be concluded that most of the respondents had wives and dependents to look 
after. Of the 20 respondents, 12 had two dependants, and eight had one dependant. 
Although one respondent is divorced and one a widow, the two were married. The 
marital status in an organisation plays an important role as the employees always act 
responsibly and this could be the case with the security investigators employed in 
the refinery. 
 
e) Highest educational qualifications 
All (100%) responded to the question about highest educational qualifications. Of the 
20 (100%) respondents, 16 had Standard 10/Grade 12 and four had a three-year 
diploma/degree. 
 
Deduction: 
The highest educational qualification attained by most respondents is Standard 
10/Grade 12, while only four had three-year diploma/degree. It would seem that 
tertiary qualifications are not a prerequisite for investigation positions. The most 
important requirement is the experience that an individual possess. It would appear 
that most of the respondents have more than ten years of work experience and the 
investigation skills in the field of work. The investigations technique should be 
required for the position of an investigator.  
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Crime trends 
a) Problems of theft of PGMs 
All 20 (100%) responded by indicating that they experience theft of PGMs in the 
refinery. 
 
Deduction: 
The respondents agreed that Impala Platinum experiences problems with theft of 
PGMs and that the people involved in the theft are employees and contractors. 
Although security members were not mentioned, it came to light that security 
members were also involved in the theft of PGMs. It also emerged that suspects 
involved in the theft were known to the investigators. From the statistics obtained 
during the site visit by the researcher, it is clear that security officers colluded with 
the employees and contractors in the theft of PGMs. 
 
b) Motivation for criminals 
In terms of motivation for criminals, 20 (100%) responded and they all mentioned 
money as being a motivator and the opportunity to commit theft. 
 
Deduction: 
According to the respondents, criminal syndicates consider money as a motivating 
factor to commit crime and the opportunity to commit theft of PGMs. The 
respondents stated that theft is committed on a daily basis by the syndicates that 
include employees, contractors and security officers. The security systems in place 
are monitored by the security officers colluding with criminal elements in the refinery. 
The PGMs are accessible to the employees and that motivate them to commit theft 
and involve contractors and security officers. 
 
c) Theft of PGMs: A challenge 
In terms of theft of PGMs being a challenge, all (100%) responded that the theft of 
PGMs is a challenge to the mining and refining industry. 
 
Deduction: 
They all agree that theft of PGMs in the mining and refining industry is a real 
challenge – by mentioning production loss, demand of the product by syndicates 
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(levels two – five), promotion of the underworld market, and opportunities for the 
syndicates (level one) to steal the product from the place of origin. The theft of PGMs 
is syndicate-driven and the manner in which the product is stolen is through rectum 
parcels hidden inside the body of individuals in the refinery. According to the 
investigators, they have not had a case where confession was made by suspects 
during arrests. 
 
d) Relationship with SAPS Organised Crime Unit 
In terms of the relationship, eight (40%) of the respondents indicated that the 
relationship is good, eight (40%) indicated a bad relationship, while four (20%) did 
not respond. 
 
Deduction: 
The respondents’ responses were different with regards to the work relationship with 
the SAPS Organised Crime unit. It was also indicated by the respondents that 
members of the Organised Crime Unit are involved in corruption or criminal activities. 
Their involvement in corruption/criminal activities occurred as a result of poor 
investigations, exchange of high value exhibits with lower value exhibits, the 
disappearance of exhibits and case dockets, and the failure by the SAPS 
investigator to inform complainants and the witnesses regarding trial dates. Not all 
the members of Organised Crime Unit can thoroughly investigate theft of PGMs and 
Precious stones 
 
e) Theft of PGMs has a negative impact on mining and refining 
The respondents (100%) indicated that theft of PGMs does have a negative impact 
on mining and refining. 
 
Deduction: 
The responses indicated that it is obvious that theft of PGMs will have a negative 
impact on mining and refining – since there is loss of production, promotion of an 
underworld market, and customers might decide to do business with the underworld 
market – since the stolen product can be bought at a cheaper price than what the 
legitimate product can be bought for from the mine and/or refinery. Theft has direct 
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influence on the future existence, expansion and the profitability of the mines and 
refinery. 
 
f) Relationship with National Prosecuting Authority 
All the respondents (100%) stated that the relationship with the NPA regarding the 
theft of PGMs is bad. 
 
Deduction: 
It can be concluded that the work relationship between investigators and the NPA is 
unhealthy – if one looks at the responses of the respondents. It also came to light 
that the success rate of convictions was only fair, suggesting that the relationship 
could be bad as was indicated by the respondents. The successful work relationship 
will be determined by the successful convictions of those involved, followed by the 
sentence that reflect the gravity of the offence that ruthlessly undermine mining and 
refining industry. Unless the criminal syndicates are convicted and sentenced 
appropriately, all the hard work lives risked to expose the offenders will be in vain. 
 
g) Intelligence network 
In terms of the intelligence network, it is clear that investigators (100%) make use of 
it to collect and gather information with regard to theft of PGMs. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear from the respondents that informers are there to help with information 
regarding the theft of PGMs. Although theft occurs, investigators rely on informers to 
provide them with information about when theft is committed, how it is done, and by 
whom. Crime syndicates need to be investigated by utilising undercover projects 
where agents infiltrate the syndicate. The investigating techniques will attempt to 
eradicate criminal elements at the source (level one) and terminate the trafficking in 
illegal and stolen PGMs. 
 
h) Individuals caught stealing 
In terms of individuals who are caught stealing, twenty (100%) respondents stated 
that they are arrested and handed over to the SAPS. 
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Deduction: 
Respondents indicated that the arrested individuals are charged departmentally, 
where a disciplinary enquiry is held – and if found guilty, such an individual will be 
dismissed. The person arrested will be interviewed by the investigators to determine 
their involvement in the theft of PGMs. The exhibit found on an individual will be 
confiscated, weighed, have photos taken in the presence of the suspect and then be 
handed over to the SAPS for further investigation and prosecution. The co-operation 
between the security investigators, SAPS and NPA is very important in a situation 
where an individual or group of people are caught stealing and it is where the work 
relation has to be strong to eradicate criminal elements. 
 
i) Exportation of stolen product (PGMs) 
In terms of exportation of PGMs, all (100%) agreed that the stolen product (PGMs) is 
exported internationally. 
 
Deduction: 
Based on the response of the participants, it can be concluded that the stolen 
product is exported internationally to countries such as Russia, Belgium and United 
Kingdom. The PGMs are exported via Zambia to international operatives (level five) 
and are smuggled in large quantities. The export of PGMs will take place by air and 
shipment to the international destination with false description of the product as well 
as under-declaration of its value. 
 
j) Criminals working alone or in groups 
In terms of criminals working alone or in groups, all (100%) respondents stated that 
criminals work in groups – meaning syndicate-driven. 
 
Deduction: 
Although the rectum parcels as modus operandi are removed by individuals (level 
one) from the source, it is actually syndicate-driven since the stolen product will then 
be handed over to an individual(s) outside the refinery (level two) that is/are part of a 
particular crime syndicate. Males and females irrespective of gender older than 18 
years are involved in the syndicates and theft of PGMs. There are no ethnic group 
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components in the crime syndicates and the ultimate goal of the syndicate is to 
smuggle PGMs to enrich themselves. 
 
Security measures 
a) Security measures 
In terms of security measures, 20 (100%) respondents stated that there are security 
measures in place at Impala Platinum. 
 
Deduction: 
In accordance with the respondents, it is common that security measures are in 
place and that they are very effective. CCTV cameras are monitored 24/7 from the 
control room by nine security officers. Any irregularities observed on the monitors are 
reported to the investigators. From the statistics obtained by the researcher, it would 
appear that the existing security measures as indicated by the respondents are not 
effective when taking into consideration theft of PGMs committed by employees, 
contractors and security officers. The vulnerabilities of the security system in place 
were identified during the site visit. 
 
b) Security systems maintained 
In terms of the maintenance, 20 (100%) respondents stated that security systems 
are maintained regularly. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear from the respondents that security systems are maintained regularly, and 
also on a daily basis. In terms of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between Impala 
Platinum and the service providers, maintenance had to be done regularly and on a 
daily basis.  
 
c)  Security procedures and policies 
In accordance with all (100%) respondents, security procedures and policies are in 
place. 
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Deduction: 
The security procedures and policies in place are known by the employees and 
audits on them are done regularly by the designated employees. The employees are 
familiar with both procedures and policies. The policies and procedures are not 
detailed as supposing and it can be the shortcoming and causes of theft of PGMs in 
the refinery. The respondents could not say how effective are the policies and 
procedures but from the theft point of view, security officers and employees are not 
familiar with the contents thereof.  
 
 
d) Security awareness programme 
In terms of the security awareness programme, all (100%) respondents indicated 
that it is in place with regards to crime in general. 
 
Deduction: 
The security awareness programme in terms of crime and other security related 
issues is in place and promoted through security induction and security flyers on a 
weekly basis. All the employees are made aware of the consequences of being 
involved in crime and that they, as the employees, contractors and security officers 
have to report any suspicious behaviour of colleagues or any suspicious items to 
security – by making use of the toll-free number provided by the company. 
 
4.2.3 Security officers’ questionnaires 
Biographical details 
a) Gender 
In terms of gender, of the sixty (100%) respondents, only 50 (90%) responded: 40 
were males and 10 were females. 
 
Deduction: 
It is evident from the respondents that there are more male security officers 
employed than female security officers. One can infer that previously, a strongly 
male dominated in security industry. It is now that female had started to join the 
previously male dominated environment (Security Industry) and most of the female 
joining the industry were previously employed by SAPS. 
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b) Age 
In terms of age, of the 60 (100%) respondents, only 50 responded: 40 were aged 19- 
50, and 10 were older than 50 years. 
 
Deduction: 
Most of the respondents were aged between 19 - 50 years. Most respondents are 
still young and some of them just completed Grade 12. The younger respondents 
have a career future in the security industry. The ten respondents were older than 50 
years and 4 of them are heading for pension. The ten respondents are more 
experienced that the respondents aged 19-50. 
 
c) Race  
In terms of race (100%), 50 (90%) responded: 20 were white and 30 were black. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear that racial representation prevail amongst the respondents. In terms of the 
employment of security officers, race is not an issue and one can conclude that 
employment equity is considered during employment. It would appear that the junior 
ranks in security is black dominated and they have no vast experience as compared 
to the white counterpart. 
 
d) Marital status 
In terms of marital status, 50 (90%) responded: 20 were married, 25 divorced/single, 
and five were widows/widowers. 
 
Deduction: 
Based on the responses, there were more divorced/single respondents than married 
ones. It is clear that from the married respondents, that they had families (wives and 
children) to take care of as compared to others (widows/widowers and 
divorced/single). Of the 50 respondents, 10 had one dependant, 20 had two 
dependants, and 20 had three or more dependants. 
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e) Highest education qualification 
In terms of highest educational qualifications, of the 60 (100%), only 50 (90%) 
responded: 42 had Standard 10/Grade 12 and eight had a three-year 
diploma/degree. 
 
Deduction: 
Based on the responses, the highest qualification was Standard 10/Grade 12. 
However, eight respondents had a three-year diploma/degree. One can conclude 
that the pre-requisite for security officer positions was Standard 10/Grade 12, with a 
three-year diploma/degree being an advantage. The respondents work positions 
were Senior Shift Supervisors (SSS), Senior Security Officers (SSO), and Security 
Officers (SO). It would appear that most have one-nine years’ work experience, while 
the others had more than 10 years of work experience. 
 
Crime trends 
a) Prevalence of theft of PGMs 
Of sixty (100%) respondents, 50 (90%) responded and indicated that theft of PGMs 
is a problem. 
 
Deduction: 
From the responses, it is clear that Impala experienced problems with theft of PGMs. 
Respondents agreed that people involved in the theft are employees, contractors 
and security officers. Although respondents were reluctant to respond – from the 
research findings it was clear that contractors and security officers are involved in 
the theft of PGMs. It also emerged that of the 50 respondents, 15 knew the suspects, 
while 35 said suspects were unknown. The respondents that indicated that suspects 
are known to them were afraid to mention them. 
 
b) Motivation for criminals 
In terms of motivation for criminals, of the 60 (100%) respondents, only 50 (90%) 
responded and they indicated that money is a motivating factor.  
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Deduction: 
According to the respondents, criminal syndicates consider money as a motivating 
factor to commit crime and the opportunity to commit theft of PGMs. The 
respondents stated that theft is committed on a daily basis by the syndicates that 
include employees, contractors and security officers. The security systems in place 
are monitored by the security officers colluding with criminal elements in the refinery. 
The PGMs are accessible to the employees and that motivate them to commit theft 
and involve contractors and security officers. 
 
c) Theft of PGMs – a challenge 
In terms of theft of PGMs being a challenge, 50 (90%) responded by indicating that 
theft is a challenge for Impala Platinum. 
 
Deduction: 
Although it was not asked from the respondents to elaborate on their responses, it is 
evident from the statistics that theft of PGMs is a challenge for the organisation. The 
respondents all agree that theft of PGMs in the mining and refining industry is a real 
challenge – by mentioning production loss, demand of the product by syndicates 
(levels two – five), promotion of the underworld market, and opportunities for the 
syndicates (level one) to steal the product from the place of origin (refinery). The 
theft of PGMs is syndicate-driven and the manner in which the product is stolen is 
through rectum parcels hidden inside the body of individuals in the refinery.  
 
d) Organised Crime Unit involvement in corruption/criminal activities 
In terms of involvement of members of the Organised Crime Unit, it was indicated by 
respondents (90%) – that they are involved. 
 
Deduction: 
From the responses it was established that their involvement results from poor 
investigations, exchange of high-value exhibits for lower value ones, the 
disappearance of exhibits and case dockets, and the failure to inform complainants 
and witnesses about trial dates. The respondents further stated that members of 
Organised Crime Unit visits accused persons at their residential places to extort 
money from them. 
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e) Theft has a negative impact on mining and refining 
In terms of negative impact, of the 60 (100%) respondents, 50 (90%) said that theft 
has a negative impact on mining and refining. 
 
Deduction: 
It is obvious that theft has a negative impact since loss of production will emerge, 
promotion of underworld markets emerges which will result in customers buying from 
the underworld – and hence the price will be less than that in the legitimate market.  
Theft has direct influence on the future existence, expansion and the profitability of 
the mines and refinery. 
 
 
f) Individuals caught stealing 
In terms of individuals caught stealing, of the 60 respondents (100%), 50 (90%) said 
that they are arrested. 
 
Deduction: 
All the individuals arrested will be charged criminally and departmentally. The 
individual arrested will be handed over to the police for further investigations. The 
particular individual will be charged departmentally – where a disciplinary enquiry will 
be held. The exhibit found on the suspect is confiscated and handed over to the 
police for analysis and court purposes. 
 
g) Exportation of stolen product 
In terms of exportation of stolen product, of 60 (100%) respondents, only 50 (90%) 
responded that the stolen material is exported. 
 
Deduction: 
From the respondents it is agreed that the PGMs are exported to the international 
destination. Based on the response of the participants, it can be concluded that the 
stolen product is exported internationally to countries such as Russia, Belgium and 
United Kingdom. The PGMs are exported via Zambia to international operatives 
(level five) and are smuggled in large quantities. The export of PGMs will take place 
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by air and shipment to the international destination with false description of the 
product as well as under-declaration of its value. 
 
4.3 COMPARISON OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF SECURITY MANAGERS, 
SECURITY INVESTIGATORS AND SECURITY OFFICERS 
The comparison of these questionnaires is outlined below: 
 
a) Experience theft of PGMs 
All (100%) of the respondents indicated that Impala Platinum mines and refinery 
experience theft of PGMs. 
 
Deduction: 
It is clear from the respondents that theft of PGMs is a serious problem and has 
direct influence on the future existence, expansion and profitability of the mines and 
refinery. It is also clear that security measures in place are not effective as one 
would think. The collusion between employees, contractors and security officers with 
regard to theft is a challenge – and drastic measures should be introduced to 
eliminate the collusion between the employees, contractors and security officers. 
 
b) Organised Crime Unit involvement in corruption/criminal activities 
The respondents (100%) agreed that members or the Organised Crime Unit are 
involved in corruption/criminal activities. 
 
Deduction: 
All the respondents indicated the involvement of members in corruption/criminal 
activities. They stated that members of the Organised Crime Unit will always ask 
about the platinum when conducting investigations. They deliberately conduct poor 
investigations against suspects known to them, ensure the disappearance of case 
dockets, fail to inform complainants and witnesses about trial dates, exchange high-
value exhibits with lower value ones and visit suspects at their places of residence. 
From the responses, it is indicated that money is received by members of the unit – 
to enrich themselves in a corrupt manner. 
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c) Theft of PGMs has a negative impact in the mining industry 
The all three respondents went on to indicate that theft of PGMs has a negative 
impact in the mining industry. 
 
Deduction: 
It is indicated that loss of production occurred as a result of theft – suggesting a 
negative impact in the mining industry; losses of revenue to the industry also 
emerge, promotion of the underworld market rises, possible retrenchments of 
employees are contemplated, future existence come into play, the profitability of 
mines and refinery is incurred. PGMs are a national asset and in the North West 
Province, in particular, they form the pillars of the social and economic structure. The 
mining industry spend a lot of money on security to curb the theft but due to the 
nature of the PGMs process it is impossible to prevent theft from occurring and it 
impacts negatively. 
 
d) Exportation of stolen material 
The respondents agreed that stolen material is exported internationally. 
 
Deduction: 
The respondents indicated that the exportation of the material by crime syndicates is 
done via shipments and by air. They will use cement bags to ship the stolen material 
– which would look legitimate, just like cement being exported. The exportation of the 
stolen material can be in convertor matte, salt format, or in the final stage of the 
material. The syndicates will falsify the description of the product as well as an 
under-declaration of its value. They are all in agreement that PGMs are exported via 
Zambia and Zimbabwe in our neighbouring countries to the international destination 
such as United Kingdom, Switzerland, Russia and Belgium. 
 
e) Relationship with National Prosecuting Authority 
All three respondents indicated differently in terms of the relationship with the NPA 
regarding the theft of PGMs is bad. 
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Deduction: 
It can be concluded that the work relationship between respondents and the NPA is 
unhealthy – if one looks at the responses form the respondents. It also came to light 
that the success rate of convictions was only fair, suggesting that the relationship 
could be bad as was indicated by the respondents. The successful work relationship 
will be determined by the successful convictions of those involved, followed by the 
sentence that reflect the gravity of the offence that ruthlessly undermine mining and 
refining industry. Unless the criminal syndicates are convicted and sentenced 
appropriately, all the hard work lives risked to expose the offenders will be in vain. It 
very important to ensure that relations between the respondents and the NPA is 
always intact to fight the theft of PGMs in the mining and refining industry. 
 
 
4.4  STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF SECURITY 
MANAGERS, SECURITY INVESTIGATORS AND SECURITY OFFICERS  
The research findings in this chapter deal with statistical comparison between the 
three responses in the questionnaires from security managers, security investigators 
and security officers. The statistical comparison included only common aspects 
which were researched in all three questionnaires – and they were all open-ended 
questions. 
 
4.4.1 Open-ended questions 
For comparison of the participants via open-ended questions for security managers, 
security investigators and security officers – the following standard questions were 
asked of all three sets of respondents: 
 
 Do you experience any problems regarding theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs) at Impala Platinum mines and refinery; 
 
 Who do you think is involved in the theft of PGMs; 
 
 What do you think motivates criminals to steal PGMs; 
 
 How often do you think theft is committed at Impala Platinum mines and 
refinery; 
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 Do you think theft of PGMs is a challenge to the mining and refining industry; 
 
 Do you think SAPS Organised Crime Unit members are involved in 
corruption/criminal activities relating to PGMs; 
 
 Does theft of PGMs have any negative impact in the mining industry; and 
 
 Do you think that the stolen material (PGMs) is exported internationally? 
 
 What are the underlying reasons for the theft of PGMs? 
 
 What is the modus operandi used in the theft of PGMs? 
 
 What are the causes of theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum? 
 
 What is the extent of the losses suffered by Impala Platinum? 
 
The following paragraphs will indicate the comparison between the responses from 
the three sets of respondents – followed by a discussion of each compared question. 
 
Table 4.1:  Did you experience any problems regarding theft of PGMs at 
Impala Platinum mines and refinery? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion:  
All the respondents indicated yes to problems experienced by Impala Platinum 
mines and refinery with regard to the theft of PGMs. All the questionnaires delivered 
to the respondents were received back with the same response and that indicated 
that theft of PGMs is a serious problem to Impala Platinum mines and refinery – as 
well as to other PGMs-producing industry. The demand of PGMs by the underworld 
makes the company to encounter problems with the theft and the employees as well 
as the security officers who are supposed to look after the company assets are the 
ones involved in the criminal activities. 
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Table 4.2:  Who do you think is involved in the theft? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Employees Employees Employees 
Contractors/Security 
Officers 
Contractors/Security 
Officers 
Contractors/Security 
Officers 
 
Discussion: 
The responses from the respondents are similar – indicating that employees, 
security officers and contractors (level one operatives) are the people involved in the 
theft of PGMs. It also emerged that employees are the people who have access to 
the product (PGMs) – since they work with the material on daily basis. They 
(employees) then remove the material from the place of origin (refinery) and take it 
out of the refinery (stealing) – or they hand the material to the contractors or security 
officers to take the material out of the plant (stealing) without being noticed. The 
employees, security officers and contractors will meet outside the boundaries of 
Impala Platinum, where the material will be handed over to the employees in 
exchange for the money promised by the syndicates (level one). The 
employees/syndicates will then sell the stolen material to the runners/illegal smelters, 
who they will in turn sell the material to the organised-crime syndicates (level three – 
five).  
 
Table 4.3:  What do you think motivates criminals to commit theft of PGMs? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Money/Greedy Money/Greedy Money/Greedy 
Underworld market Underworld market Opportunity 
Demand of PGMs Opportunity  
 
Discussion: 
The respondents stated that money is the main motivating factor for the employees 
and contractors to steal PGMs. Security managers and security investigators also 
indicated that there is an underworld market out there and that it is very easy to sell 
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stolen material to the underworld market. Security managers further indicated that 
PGMs are in demand outside the illegitimate market. From the security investigators 
and security officers, it can be concluded that opportunity to steal can also be a 
motivational factor driving syndicates to steal PGMs. 
 
Table 4.4:  How often do you think theft is committed at Impala Platinum 
mines and refinery? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
2 x per week Daily Daily 
Other   
 
Discussion:  
This question was answered differently by the respondents, although security 
investigators and security officers agreed that theft of PGMs is committed on a daily 
basis. Security managers stated that theft is committed two times per week. Security 
investigators and security officers are physically on hand when it comes to 
prevention of crime or protection of company assets. They might be correct to say 
that theft of PGMs is committed on a daily basis. 
 
Table 4.5:  Do you think that theft of PGMs is a challenge to the mining and 
refining industry? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
They all agree that theft of PGMs in the mining and refining industry is a real 
challenge – by mentioning production loss, demand of the product by syndicates 
(levels two – five), promotion of the underworld market, and opportunities for the 
syndicates (level one) to steal the product from the place of origin. The theft of PGMs 
is syndicate-driven and the manner in which the product is stolen is through rectum 
parcels hidden inside the body of individuals in the refinery. Theft also affects the 
economy of the country since no tax revenues are paid by the crime syndicates and 
the shareholders of the mining industry are also affected by the theft.  
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Table 4.6:  Do you think SAPS’ Organised Crime Unit members are involved 
in corruption/criminal activities relating to PGMs? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
All the respondents agreed that members of the SAPS Organised Crime Unit are 
involved in corruption/criminal activities. All the respondents indicated the 
involvement of members in corruption/criminal activities. They stated that members 
of the Organised Crime Unit will always ask about the platinum when conducting 
investigations. They deliberately conduct poor investigations against suspects known 
to them, ensure the disappearance of case dockets and exhibits, fail to inform 
complainants and witnesses about trial dates, exchange high-value exhibits with 
lower value exhibits, fail to send PGMs to the laboratory for analytical purposes and 
visit suspects at their places of residence to extort money. From the responses, it is 
indicated that money is received by members of the unit – to enrich themselves in a 
corrupt manner. 
 
Table 4.7:  Does theft of PGMs has a negative impact in the mining industry? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
The respondents answered in the affirmative to this question. They stated that loss 
of production as result of theft has a negative impact on the mining industry. It is 
indicated that loss of production occurred as a result of theft of PGMs – suggesting a 
negative impact in the mining industry; losses of revenue to the industry also 
emerge, promotion of the underworld market rises, possible retrenchments of 
employees are contemplated, future existence come into play, the profitability of 
mines and refinery is incurred. PGMs are a national asset and in the North West 
Province, in particular, they form the pillars of the social and economic structure. The 
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mining industry spend a lot of money on security to curb the theft but due to the 
nature of the PGMs process it is impossible to prevent theft from occurring and it 
impacts negatively. 
 
Table 4.8: Do you think that the stolen material (PGMs) is exported 
internationally? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
The respondents agreed that the stolen material (PGMs) is exported internationally. 
The organised crime syndicates use shipments as a way of exporting the stolen 
material. They export the stolen material disguised as either bags of cement or 
container of coffee, which will seem legitimate to authorities at harbours. The other 
way of exporting PGMs is through airport. They will use cement bags to ship the 
stolen material – which would look legitimate, just like cement being exported. The 
exportation of the stolen material can be in convertor matte, salt format, or in the final 
stage of the material. The syndicates will falsify the description of the product as well 
as an under-declaration of its value. They are all in agreement that PGMs are 
exported via Zambia and Zimbabwe to the international destination such as United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Russia and Belgium. 
 
Table 4.9:  Are the underlying reasons for theft of PGMs? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
All respondents agreed that the underlying reasons for the theft of PGMs is the 
opportunity, greediness, money and demand of PGMs by the underworld. They also 
agreed that the crime syndicates enrich themselves by committing theft of PGMs. 
The other exploitation could be that the security officers, who are supposed to 
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prevent theft from being committed are colluding with the employees and the 
contractors, and that they are aware that the security measures in place are 
ineffective. The metal detector used by Impala is ineffective and cannot detect PGMs 
when in a salt format since it only activates if the material is in a metal form. 
 
Table 4.10:  Is there modus operandi used in the theft of PGMs? 
 
Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
The respondents (security investigators and officers) all indicated that the modus 
operandi of the syndicates is similar in that they will place the PGMs in a plastic bag 
and use a tape to wrap the material in a rectum parcel form and hide the material in 
their body orifices. They will also use surgical gloves to place the PGMs and hide the 
material in their body orifices. The metal detector will fail to detect the hidden PGMs 
and they will remove the PGMs without being detected. 
 
Table 4.11:  Are there any causes of theft of PGMs from Impala Platinum? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
The respondents all agreed that the security measures in place that are not effective 
could lead to the causes of theft of PGMs. The co-operation from the employees, 
contractors and security officers could also be a contributing factor to the theft of 
PGMs. The respondents indicated that it would seem that the PGMs are easily 
accessible to the employees since they are working with the material on a daily basis 
thus making it easy to commit theft of the PGMs. The opportunity and the money 
could also be the causes of theft of PGMs. 
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Table 4.12:   Is there an extent of losses (product and financially) suffered by 
Impala Platinum? 
 
Security Managers Security Investigators Security Officers 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Discussion: 
The respondents (security managers and investigators) indicated that the extent of 
losses suffered by the company amounts to millions although they could not give an 
exact amount but it’s over and above R20 million for the period 2004-2014. From the 
statistics obtained from Impala where the material was recovered, it is clear that the 
company losses incurred amounts to millions per annum. 
 
4.5  COMPARISON OF EMPLOYEES’ AND CONTRACTORS’ INTERVIEWS  
The findings also deal with matters for comparison of the interviews between 
employees and contractors. The same interview schedule of questions was utilised 
by the researcher for employees and contractors and they were open-ended and 
mostly open-ended nominal questions. All the interviewees agreed that theft of 
PGMs is a challenge to Impala and other mining industries. The seven interviewed 
permanent contractors also agreed that causes of theft is opportunity, greediness 
and enrichment by the crime syndicates operating from the refinery. Some of the 
employees and contractors agreed that there is a collusion with security officers to 
steal PGMs from the refinery.  
 
The employees and contractors also agreed that the PGMs are stolen in the form of 
salt and are removed from the refinery in a rectum parcel format. From the statistics 
obtained, the researcher is of the opinion that employees are the most influential 
syndicates in the hierarchy level of crime syndicates and plays an important role as 
employees have access to the PGMs in the refinery and work with the PGMs on 
daily basis. 
 
The employees and contractors responded that security officers and some 
employees work together to steal PGMs and that they also use contractors to 
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remove the product from the plant in the refinery. The theft of PGMs is syndicate-
driven and they indicated that Impala employees are the people who have access to 
the product. The employees remove the product from the place of origin in the 
refinery where parcels containing PGMs are manufactured – before these are 
removed from the plant in the refinery.  
 
They all agreed that money and greedy plays an important role in the lives of the 
crime syndicates as they are used to live luxury at the expense of the refinery. Some 
of the employees and contractors agreed that opportunity to commit theft of PGMs is 
also a contributing factor to the loss of assets to Impala Platinum. 
 
The respondents agreed that syndicates (employees) provide families of the security 
officers and/or contractors with money in the case where one of their members is 
arrested. The respondents further indicated that crime syndicates within the refinery 
are so organised and co-operative in their unlawful activities, meaning that they 
carefully look after each other. 
 
 4.6  FINDINGS OF METHOD OF PROTECTION 
 
 It was found that Impala has outsourced security to Bidvest Protea Coin as the 
service provider, which company has deployed security officers in the refinery. 
These security officers’ tasks are to conduct detailed individual searches, patrol 
in the refinery, and escort the PGMs to the airport. It was established that some 
of the security officers are colluding with crime syndicates (Employees and 
Contractors) to remove PGMs from the refinery. The security officers involved fail 
to conduct detailed individual searches to employees and contractors exiting the 
refinery. 
 
 The metal detectors are utilised by security officers to conduct detailed individual 
body searches of all employees, contractors and security exiting the refinery. The 
main objective of the metal detectors is to detect foreign objects (PGMs) either 
inside or on the bodies of employees, contractors and security officers exiting the 
refinery. It was found that the metal detectors are ineffective and cannot detect 
96 
©University of South Africa 2016 
foreign objects (PGMs) in salt form inside the body of an individual during 
searches. It was established that the metal detector only activates if a pure metal 
(PGMs) is detected inside the body of an individual and not if the PGMs are in a 
salt form (yellow substance). 
 
 Policies and procedures in place serve as operational guidelines to all in the 
refinery. They form part of a comprehensive security plan which the security 
service provider employees need to implement, manage and monitor while 
ensuring that employees and contractors adhere to them. It was found that the 
policies and procedures in place do not indicate properly how searches should be 
conducted on individuals exiting the refinery. 
 
 There are two ways of promoting security awareness in the refinery being 
distribution of security flyers and presenting inductions to employees and 
contractors. From the statistics obtained by the researcher, it is his opinion that 
the security awareness in place is ineffective if one has to take into consideration 
the theft of PGMs committed for the period 2004 – 2014. 
 
 There are more than 500 CCTV surveillance cameras installed that cover 
strategic and high risk areas in the refinery. There are also CCTV surveillance 
cameras inside the search cubicle and all these cameras are monitored from the 
two control rooms. There is a Third Tier (Control room) which oversees both 
control rooms to ensure that CCTV surveillance cameras are effectively 
monitored. It was found that the CCTV surveillance cameras footages are also 
used for the investigations purposes during internal disciplinary enquiries and for 
prosecution. 
 
 The access control is in the form of turnstiles in most areas in the refinery, where 
one has to swipe his/her access card before entering or exiting the area. The 
refinery make use of access cards (proximity cards) to employees, contractors 
and security officers to access area of work, to identify its employees as well as 
the contractors (KMA Workforce, LADS construction and Bidvest Protea Coin) 
and those access cards are also used to report on/off duty. The person issued 
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with the card is responsible for it and it should be kept in his/her possession at all 
times in the refinery. 
 
4.7  FINDINGS OF IMPALA MINES’ CASE DOCKETS ANALYSIS 
For this research study, the researcher selected 120 case dockets from a 500 case 
docket target population of Impala Platinum mines and refinery that were reported for 
further investigation. The researcher made use of the case docket analysis pro-
forma. The purpose of the case docket analysis pro-forma was to determine the day, 
time, location when the theft was committed, the type of product stolen, the value 
stolen, and the modus operandi of criminals. The process of the pro-forma was also 
to obtain information in relation to arrests, disciplinary hearings and criminal 
convictions of the accused. Of the 120 reported case dockets, 90 were finalised, 
closed and filed by Impala Platinum.  
 
The 90 filed case dockets were perused by the researcher, and according to the 
analysis, suspects were found in possession of PGMs. The suspects were charged 
with Theft and Possession of Suspected PGMs. The other 30 case dockets were still 
on the court roll and pending, but were also perused by the researcher. The pending 
case dockets resulted from an outstanding analysis report from the SAPS laboratory. 
The PGMs recovered by the investigators were mostly platinum in a salt format 
(yellow substance) – which according to the investigators cannot be detected by the 
metal detectors used by Impala Platinum. The weight varies for individual PGMs, as 
well as the values.  
 
All the cases where the employees, contractors and security officers were arrested 
disciplinary actions were instituted and perpetrators were dismissed for dishonesty. 
In criminal court cases some perpetrators pleaded guilty and, suspended sentences 
or fines were imposed against them, whereas in the cases where trial was 
conducted, some were found guilty with minor sentences imposed and/or sentences 
wholly suspended without jail term.  
 
 In some instances, the accused persons were sentenced to imprisonment with an 
option of a fine and fines will be paid in order to avoid being sent to jail. The accused 
persons were males and females that included employees, security officers, and 
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contractors. In case where the accused persons pleaded guilty, he/she is found 
guilty and suspended sentences were imposed on the accused by a court of law.  
 
4.8  CONCLUSION 
The survey questionnaires, which were distributed for the security managers, 
security investigators and security officers at the refinery were statistically presented. 
Every question was dealt with from the three questionnaires. Responses from all 
open-ended and nominal questions from security managers, security investigators 
and security officers were analysed, where the internal and external threats were 
identified as a result of the responses sourced from the participants.  
 
The interviews of the employees and contractors at the refinery were also statistically 
presented. Each question from the interview schedule was analysed - and 
weaknesses with regard to security measures in-place were identified. Most of the 
answers from the respondents were similar. The employees and contractors agreed 
that theft of PGMs is a challenge to Impala Platinum and others in the mining 
industry and that security officers, employees and contractors are in collusion in the 
theft of PGMs. 
 
This chapter dealt with data analysis, a statistical report, data comparison and 
research findings. Chapter 5 will focus on recommendations and the conclusion, and 
the implementation of the recommendations. The recommendations will be of 
important to Impala Platinum mines and refinery and others in the platinum-
producing industry, and will also help to improve current security measures in place.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, the motivation for the research and the problem statement were 
discussed. Chapter 2 presented the research methodologies used during the 
research. Chapter 3 contextualized the challenges facing Impala and other mining 
industries – with regard to the theft of PGMs, and identified the levels of criminal 
syndicates and the modus operandi of criminals. It also indicated the people involved 
in the theft of PGMs as employees, and reviewed some of the information, findings 
and recommendations from other sources dealing with the implementation of 
effective security measures for the prevention of theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum – 
and possibly at other mining industries in South Africa. In Chapter 4, the findings of 
the research were presented, in accordance with the methodologies applied and 
mentioned in Chapter 2. 
 
This chapter focuses on the recommendations – based on the aims and objectives of 
the study – and presents the conclusion with regard to the betterment of security 
measures identified during the research study. 
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations made will be as a result of the research findings. The findings 
based on the method of protection, modus operandi, crime syndicates categories, 
and docket analysis are combined to enable the researcher to provide a 
comprehensive security survey sheet. The security survey sheet as well as the notes 
on how security survey has to be approached was compiled based on Security Risk 
Management Model and it provided a security risk management approach to 
securing PGMs from being stolen. The security sheet consisted of checklist of the 
product, security measures and the location of the plants in the refinery. The main 
objective of conducting security survey is to identify and improve the level of 
protection in the refinery against the threat of theft of PGMs. 
 
Emanating from the research findings, it was found that theft of PGMs is a challenge 
facing Impala Platinum refinery and mining industry – in particular in the platinum-
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producing mines in South Africa. Based on the research findings, it was found that 
the security measures in place in the refinery are ineffective in preventing and 
protecting assets (PGMs) belonging to Impala Platinum. Emerging from the research 
findings and responses, the following recommendations are made: 
 
5.2.1 Recommendations to the employer 
It is recommended that the following be considered and implemented: 
 
1. Policies and procedures 
There are a number of valid reasons for an employer to have written workplace 
policies and procedures in place. Such policies and procedures are useful 
documents to rely on when a legal dispute arises between the employer and 
employee. It is thus vital for Impala Platinum to have policies and procedures in 
place – since they are guidelines for both the employer and the employee on how 
things should be done in the organisation. 
 
The policies and procedures in place need to be reviewed by all stakeholders and 
changes should be more detailed, and implemented to enhance the effectiveness of 
the policies and procedures. It is evident from the findings, that policies and 
procedures in place that are not detailed – and they need improvement. Once the 
amendments has been made, all the employers and employees must familiarise 
themselves with them. 
 
2. Pre-employment vetting 
This is the process of performing a background check on someone before offering 
them employment, and it can include checking criminal records, educational 
qualifications, and pre-employment polygraph testing. 
 
3. Screening of criminal records of prospective employees/contractors 
It is very important for an organisation to check the criminal records of prospective 
employees or contractors – to ensure that they do not have previous convictions. It 
will help the company to not employ individuals with criminal records related to 
dishonest activities. 
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It was found that the criminal-record screening process is not the norm at Impala 
Platinum mines and refinery. It is therefore recommended that the criminal-record 
screening process be implemented at the rest of the Impala operations and 
employees as well as contractors to be screened – to help prevent the company 
from employing individuals with criminal records. 
 
4. Pre-employment polygraph testing 
Pre-employment polygraph tests should be utilised to verify the person’s truthfulness 
in the workplace. Although there is no legislation to control the use of the polygraph 
test, it will help the organisation before employing individuals. The tests will ensure 
that the organisation: 
 
 Prevent individuals prone to theft of employer’s assets, but who have not been 
arrested, from being employed 
 
 Prevent individuals getting employed via false pretences 
 
 Prevent the infiltration of individuals organised by outside and inside crime 
syndicates 
 
 Prevent dishonesty in those in a position of trust 
 
 Prevent deliberate falsification of documents and lies regarding the true identity 
of particular individuals. 
 
5. Routine evaluation polygraph testing 
From the research findings, it was established that only security members are 
evaluated periodically to establish their involvement in theft. It was also established 
that security members and employees work together to steal PGMs. It is 
recommended that all employees directly involved in working with the product should 
also be evaluated periodically – to establish their involvement in the theft of PGMs. 
Where an individual is found to be involved in theft after being evaluated, that 
particular individual should be transferred to a lower risk section – to eliminate 
potential criminal activities. 
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5.2.2 Recommendations on security measures 
Security measures are designed to deny unauthorised access to facilities, 
equipment, assets, and resources – and also to protect personnel and property from 
damage or harm such as theft, espionage, or terrorist attacks. Security measures 
involves= the use of multiple layers of inter-dependent systems which includes 
CCTV surveillance, security officers, access-control protocols, low-dose X-ray body 
scanning and many other techniques. The following security measures are 
recommended for implementation: 
 
1. Security officers 
It was found that security officers are colluding with the employees and contractors 
(level one operatives) to steal PGMs from the refinery. The following 
recommendations are made: 
 
i. Physical security patrols, plant sweeps, random plant searches and locker 
searches should be conducted on a daily basis by senior security officers – 
including supervisors. 
 
ii. Security audits and risk assessments should be conducted on a regular basis 
to identify vulnerable areas and risk-areas. 
 
iii. Senior security officers should be employed at the high-risk area where the 
product originates, in order to enhance the effective protection of PGMs. 
 
iv. Rotation of security officers should be implemented to avoid complacency, 
collusion with crime syndicates (level one operatives), and also recruitment 
from the crime syndicates. 
 
v. An investigation team should improve the intelligence network and implement 
reward scheme to individuals report any illegal activities in the refinery 
regarding the theft of PGMs. 
vi. A security-awareness programme during inductions presentation should 
include the court convictions to serve as a deterrent to the employees, 
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contractors and security officers regarding criminal activities inside and 
outside the organisation. 
 
vii. The trust-work relationship should be improved with supervisors and 
employees – regarding reporting of criminal activities within Impala Platinum. 
 
viii. A toll-free number should be established and made known to enable 
employees to report any suspicious activities or any irregularities. 
 
2. Access control 
Access control refers to the practice of restricting entrance to a property, a building, 
or a room – to authorised persons. This can be achieved by human and 
technological means such as access-control systems. These systems determine 
who is allowed to enter or exit, where they are allowed to exit or enter, and when 
they are allowed to enter or exit.  
 
Access-control systems should be reviewed to limit access to employees working at 
the high-risk section where the product originates. To prevent unauthorised access 
to employees, it is recommended that fingerprint biometric measurement, be 
installed to determine the uniqueness of the fingerprint– which will give access to 
authorised employees only. It is also recommended that senior security guards be 
employed at the high-risk section, since it will then be difficult for the syndicate to 
recruit. 
 
3. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance systems 
The CCTV surveillance cameras are deemed to be one of the most effective crime-
prevention measures in the security industry. From the research site visit, it was 
established that there are more than 500 CCTV cameras installed at Impala 
Platinum Refinery, and they are monitored 24/7 from the control rooms by security 
officers. The CCTV surveillance cameras are mostly placed in areas that are not 
high-risk.  
 
The researcher considers that more CCTV cameras should be installed in high-risk 
areas where PGMs originate, and where employees perform their daily tasks when 
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dealing with the material. A dedicated team from security should be employed to 
monitor the proposed CCTV cameras (high-risk area) from the PMR plant. They 
should monitor the movements of the PGMs in the high-risk areas, as well as the 
movements of the employees – to detect any irregularities. The areas should be 
monitored 24/7, and any suspicious movements detected should be reported 
immediately, in order to enhance speedy reaction from management or the security 
department. 
 
The following security survey aimed at: 
 
 Examining the current state of security measures in place in the refinery with 
a view of identifying security weaknesses and vulnerabilities;  
 
 Ensuring that the minimum security measures required by the refinery, 
legislation and by insurance companies are in place, in order to mitigate the 
security risk of theft of PGMs and be managed cost-effectively; and 
 
 Identifying the new security risks in the current security measures in place at 
the refinery. 
 
4. Recommended security survey sheet 
 
CONTROL ISSUE YES NO COMMENTS 
A TYPE OF PRODUCT    
1. Platinum    
2. Rhodium    
3. Palladium & Other    
B LOCATION    
1. PMR    
2. BMR    
3. OTHER    
C SECURITY MEASURES    
1. Human Resources    
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2. Control Room    
3. CCTV Surveillance    
4. Alarm Systems    
5. Turnstiles    
6. Search Cubicles    
7. Interlocking Doors    
8. Metal Detectors    
9. Policies & Procedures    
10. Security Awareness    
11. Burglar Proofing on Windows    
12. Security Gates    
13. Adequate Lighting    
TOTAL YES ANSWERS    
TOTAL NO ANSWERS    
SECURITY WEAKNESS    
 
As soon as the security survey is completed, the information obtained must be 
advanced and a security report must be compiled. The report will entails all 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities identified, and all must be calculated. The 
weaknesses must be prioritised and vulnerability be calculated. 
 
5. Low dose X-ray body scanner 
It was established that Impala Platinum utilises hand-held body scanners to conduct 
detailed individual body search on employees, contractors and security officers 
exiting the PMR plant in the refinery. It was also established that security officers 
conduct hand body searches on employees, contractors at certain areas, without 
using the hand-held metal detectors. This method of searching is ineffective, since 
the statistics indicate that theft of PGMs occurs periodically and that employees, 
contractors, and security members are the ones involved in the theft of PGMs. 
 
A low-dose X-ray body scanner is a technology which helps to eliminate the usual 
problems associated with conventional body-searching methods, and it sends a 
zero-tolerance message to potential syndicates. It is an essential security measure 
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to prevent smuggling of precious metals and offers outstanding image quality of the 
entire body, and with high image resolution. This makes it an effective security 
measure for the detection of things like precious metals, explosives, and weapons. 
 
It is very important for Impala Platinum to consider installing such technologies – in 
order to eliminate the usual problems encountered with conventional body searching 
methods. It will help with the prevention of theft of PGMs, since it is more effective in 
detecting PGMs concealed inside the bodies of individuals. 
 
The image below is of the Low-Dose X-ray body scanner machine, which is 
recommended to be installed – in order to assist with the prevention of theft of PGMs 
at Impala Platinum and possibly in other mining industries. 
 
Image of a recommended low-dose x-ray body scanner 
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5.2.3 Recommendations to employees 
During research study, it was found that employees are working with contractors and 
security officers to remove PGMs from the refinery. It was also established that 
employees are the one providing PGMs to contractors and security officers to 
remove PGMs from the place of origin since they have access to the PGMs and they 
work with the product on daily basis. It is recommended that employees: 
 
i. Be vigilant at all times. It is always easy for the crime-syndicate members to 
create an impression that they will succeed in the theft of PGMs, if employees 
appear not to be vigilant. 
 
ii. Be assertive. Be free to express your feelings, thoughts, and desires. Do not 
allow fellow employees recruit you to be involved in the theft of PGMs. 
 
iii. Report any irregularities observed. Always report suspicious activities, 
behaviour, or objects – to either your manager or Protection Services. 
 
iv. Be the eyes and ears (for security). Take the responsibility to report any 
information at your disposal, with regard to the theft of PGMs. 
 
v. Familiarise themselves with company policies and procedures. This will assist 
in terms of knowing their contents, the repercussions involved, and will help 
the employee to know the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’, so that they do not contravene 
such policies. 
 
vi. Always be free from company assets (PGMs). Employees should be free from 
PGMs when going off duty – in order to eliminate the chances of 
apprehension by Protection Services. 
 
vii. Be resilient. Do not be tempted by other employees, by being offered 
illegitimate money to encourage co-operation with crime syndicates. 
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5.2.4 Recommendations to the government 
Based on the findings regarding the theft of PGMs in the refinery and the 
involvement of crime syndicates categories as well as the exportation of the PGMs to 
the international underworld, it is recommended that the government: 
 
i. Implement and enforce stricter measures in terms of POCA that will force the 
unauthorised underworld market to pay heavy fines or be incarcerated for long 
sentences if found guilty of dealing/smuggling in PGMs illegally. 
 
ii. Ensures that licensed dealers of PGMs are visited on a regular basis by the 
Department of Mineral Resources Regulator and the SAPS, to ensure that 
any transactions and dealings are legitimate in accordance with the Precious 
Metals Act. 
 
iii. Ensures that a dedicated SAPS unit be established which will focus mainly on 
investigation of PGMs and precious stones. The members to be trained on 
how to effectively investigate the cases of PGMs and precious stones as well 
as to positively identify all types of PGMs produced by different mining 
industries. 
 
iv. Improve the criminal justice system, prosecute better and faster and more 
effectively, so that the message can be sent to criminal syndicates as a 
deterrent – that crime does not pay and that it has repercussions. The work 
relation also to improve for the betterment of convictions. 
 
v. Ensure that crime syndicate assets obtained during organised crime manner 
are seized and forfeited to the state. The Asset Forfeiture Unit members 
should be effectively trained on how to conduct an in-depth investigation and 
apply financial techniques and strategies to expand the scope of a criminal 
investigation through identifying and tracking assets for seizure and forfeiture. 
 
vi. The SAPS Organised Crime Unit, in conjunction with Interpol, to work hand-in-
hand and better co-ordinate joint investigations into the theft of PGMs 
exported to international underworld syndicates. 
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vii. The SAPS Organised Crime Unit to utilise unconventional techniques such as 
surveillance clandestine operations (undercover projects), infiltration of 
syndicates at all levels (agents and informers), penetration (recruitment of 
suspect as informers) to address crime syndicates in the theft of PGMs. 
 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
It is recommended that further research be undertaken that will include other 
platinum-producing industries such as the Lonmin mine and the Anglo Platinum mine 
– as these are the three best platinum-producing industries in the world. It is also 
recommended that government agencies such as the South African Police Services 
(SAPS), Special Investigation Unit (SIU), South African Revenue Services (SARS) 
and National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) be included in the research study. The 
study undertaken proposes a new security RISK MANAGEMENT approach towards 
improving security risk-control measures in the mining industry – that will enable the 
prevention of theft of PGMs. 
 
The case study focused on Impala Platinum Refinery and mines, and from it, the 
hierarchy levels of organised crime syndicates in South Africa and abroad were 
identified. It was also established that the Level One operatives are employees 
within the organisation and that they operate from their workplace. The modus 
operandi of Level One will be the same from one mining industry to the other. 
Further research should be considered on the security RISK MANAGEMENT 
approach to the prevention of theft of PGMs in the platinum industry in South Africa. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This research has outlined the extent and impact of theft of PGMs at Impala 
Platinum mines and refinery in Springs, Gauteng, South Africa. The research study 
focused on the security risk management approach to the prevention of theft of 
PGMs at Impala Platinum mines and refinery. Emanating from the findings there is a 
need for improvement on the approach to the prevention strategy. 
 
The findings demonstrated that individuals and syndicates are involved in the theft 
and that they comprise employees, contractors (KMA Workforce and LADS 
Constructions) and security officers. They work together to remove PGMs from the 
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place of origin at the refinery, through security measures which are in place, and are 
taken out of the plant without being detected. 
 
The study illustrates the state of security measures in place and the desire to 
upgrade the existing security measures at Impala Platinum. The recommendations of 
the researcher will serve to deter theft as it is occurring now. In accordance with the 
respondents, theft of PGMs is a challenge to the company and in order for the 
organisation to overcome those challenges, recommendations made by the 
researcher should not be overlooked – but considered in the interests of the 
organisation. 
 
The theft of PGMs is not only encountered by Impala Platinum; it also occurs in other 
platinum-producing mines and refineries in South Africa. Therefore it is vital that 
Impala Platinum and other mining industries meet to discuss the recommendations 
made in order to consider implementing them – in order to improve existing security 
measures. 
 
The findings indicated that the modus operandi utilised by the crime syndicates (level 
one) in the refinery is similar in that the stolen product would be placed in a sample 
plastic bag and masking tape would be used to make up a rectum parcel and/or the 
PGMs would be placed in a surgical gloves and removed from the refinery. It is also 
evident from the findings that security measures in place are ineffective in the 
prevention of theft of PGMs. The crime syndicates (level one operatives) in the 
refinery are highly connected (selling PGMs) to crime syndicates (level two – illegal 
smelt houses) outside the refinery – who in turn sell the stolen material to Level 
Three - five, which is then exported to the underworld market. 
  
Conceivably, the security RISK MANAGEMENT model as proposed in dealing with 
crime risk in the refinery, the research findings and recommendations made will help 
all management, security managers and security consultants to mitigate crime risk 
and overcome challenges facing the refinery and the industry as a whole. 
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ANNEXURE A:  UNISA Ethics approval letter 
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ANNEXURE B: Questionnaire survey for security managers 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: SECURITY MANAGERS 
 
RESEARCH STUDY: A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): CASE STUDY OF 
IMPALA MINES AND REFINERY 
 
Instructions: 
Please answer all the questions. The information collected for this research study 
regarding prevention of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) will help the researcher to 
formulate effective and efficient security measures for the problems of theft encountered by 
Impala Platinum Mines and Refinery. You do not need to identify yourself and the 
researcher will ensure the response is treated with strict confidentiality and anonymity of 
participant is guaranteed. Please indicate with an ‘X’ in an appropriate box or write a 
response in the space provided. 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: 
SECTION A (Demographic Information) 
The following questions are for statistical purposes only: 
 
1. Gender Male  Female  
 
2. Age 18 – 30  30 – 50  More than 50  
 
 3. Race 
Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
 
4. Marital Status 
Single  Married  Divorced  Widow / Widower  
 
5. How many dependants do you have? 
One  Two  Three  Four or more  
 
6. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Std 8 / Grade 10  Std 9 / Grade 11  Std 10 / Grade 12  
3 year Diploma / Degree  Postgraduate Degree  
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7. What is your current work position? 
Investigating 
Officer 
 
Superintendent 
Investigations 
 
Investigations 
Manager 
 
Security 
Manager 
     
 
8. How many years of work experience do you have? 
1 year  2 years  3-5 years  5-10 years  More than 10 years  
 
SECTION B (Crime Trends) 
9. Are you part of the in-house security or working for a Security Service 
Provider? 
In-house Yes No 
Service provider Yes No 
 
10. How many security employees are in service (on site) of the Security Company 
you are working for?  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
11. How long has this Company been a Service Provider to Impala Platinum Mines 
and Refinery? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Do you experience any problems regarding theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs) at the site you are working?  
Yes  No  
 
13.  Do you have a dedicated team that deals with the theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs) at your site? 
Yes  No  
 
14. If yes, how many members are involved in dealing with theft? 
1-5 people  6-10 people  10 or more people  
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15. What are the underlying reasons for the theft of PMGs? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Who do you think is involved in the theft? 
A. Employees Yes  No  
B. Contractors Yes  No  
C. Security officers Yes  No  
D. Other Yes  No  
 
17.  If other, who do you think is involved? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
18. How often is theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) committed on your site? 
1 x per week  5 x per week  1 x per month  Other  
 
19.  What are the causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Do you think theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) is a challenge to the 
mining and refining industry?  
Yes  No  
 
21. If yes, why do you say so? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
22. What is the extent of the losses suffered by Impala Platinum since 2004 to 2014? 
R1 000 000  
R2 000 000   
R3 000 000  
Over and above   
 
23. Do you meet with other Mining Industries to deliberate on challenges facing the 
industry? 
Yes  No  
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24. If yes, how often do you meet? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
25. What is your relationship with the SAPS Organised Crime Unit regarding theft 
of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
Good  Bad  Indifferent  
 
26. Do these thefts of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) have any negative impact on 
the mining industry? 
Yes  No  Do not know  
 
27. How is your relationship with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
regarding theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
Good  Bad  Indifferent  
 
28.  What is the success rate regarding convictions of theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs)?  
Good  Bad  Indifferent  
 
29. Do you think SAPS Organised Crime Unit members are involved in corruption / 
criminal activities of Platinum Group Metals at Impala Platinum Mines and 
Refinery? 
Yes  No  
 
30. If yes, why do you think so? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
31. Do you think the stolen product (PGMs) is exported internationally? 
Yes  No  
 
32. Where do you think they export the stolen product (PGMs) to? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
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33. Does your company have Security Awareness Programmes in place regarding 
the theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
Yes  No  
 
34. If yes, how often are the programmes promoted? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
35. Do you screen Security applicants before employing them? 
Yes  No  
 
36. Do you assess Security members periodically to determine their involvement in 
the theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
Yes  No  
 
37. If yes, how often do you assess them? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
38. How are these assessments on Security members done? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION C (Security measures) 
 
39. What security measures are in place at Impala Platinum mines and refinery?  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
40. How would you rate the Security measures in place? 
Ineffective Yes No 
Effective Yes No 
Most effective Yes No 
 
41. To what extent do you agree with this statement? 
Effective Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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42. Are CCTV surveillance cameras in operation 24/7? 
Yes  No  
 
43. Are the CCTV cameras monitored from a Control Room? 
Yes  No  
44. If yes, how many Security members do the monitoring? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
45. Are the Security Systems regularly maintained? 
Yes  No  
 
46. How often are these Systems maintained? 
Daily   Weekly  Monthly   
 
47. Do you have Security Procedures and Policies in place? 
Yes  No  
 
48. If yes, do you and the employees familiarise yourselves with the contents 
thereof? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
49. Do you have any Security Awareness Programmes regarding crime in general? 
Yes  No  
 
50. If yes, how are these Awareness Programmes promoted? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
51. Is there anything else that you wish to say on this matter? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
  
126 
©University of South Africa 2016 
ANNEXURE C:  Questionnaire survey for security investigators  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: SECURITY INVESTIGATORS 
 
RESEARCH STUDY: A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): CASE STUDY OF 
IMPALA MINES AND REFINERY 
 
Instructions: 
Please answer all the questions. The information collected for this research study 
regarding prevention of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) will help the researcher to 
formulate effective and efficient security measures for the problems of theft encountered by 
Impala Platinum Mines and Refinery. You do not need to identify yourself and the 
researcher will ensure the response is treated with strict confidentiality and anonymity of 
participant is guaranteed. Please indicate with an ‘X’ in the appropriate box or write a 
response in the space provided. 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: 
SECTION A (Demographic Information) 
 
The following questions are for statistical purposes only: 
1. Gender Male  Female  
 
2. Age 18 – 30  30 – 50  More than 50  
 
 3.   Race 
Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
 
4. Marital Status 
Single  Married  Divorced  Widow / Widower  
 
5. How many dependants do you have? 
One  Two  Three  Four or more  
 
6. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Std 8 / Grade 10  Std 9 / Grade 11  Std 10 / Grade 12  
3 year Diploma / Degree  Postgraduate Degree  
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7. What is your current work position? 
Investigating 
Officer 
 
Superintendent 
Investigations 
 
Investigations 
Manager 
 
Security 
Investigator 
 
 
8. How many years of work experience do you have? 
1 year  2 years  3-5 years  5-10 years  More than 10 years  
 
SECTION B (Crime Trends) 
 
9. Do you experience any problems of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) at 
Impala Platinum Mines and Refinery? 
Yes  No  
 
10. Who do you think is involved in the theft? 
A. Employees Yes  No  
B. Contractors Yes  No  
C. Security officers Yes  No  
D. Other Yes  No  
 
11.  If other, who do you think is involved? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Do you think employees play a role in the theft of PGMs? 
Yes  No  
 
13.  If yes, what role do they play in the theft? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
14. What are the causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
15. What are the underlying reasons for the theft of PGMs? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Do you usually get confessions from perpetrators during investigations? 
Yes  No  
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17. What is the extent of the losses suffered by Impala Platinum since 2004 to 
2014? 
R1 000 000  R2 000 000  R3 000 000  Over and above  
 
18. How is your relationship with the SAPS Organised Crime Unit members 
regarding theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Do you think SAPS Organised Crime Unit members are involved in corruption / 
criminal activities of Platinum Group Metals at Impala Platinum Mines and 
Refinery? 
Yes  No  
 
20. If yes, why do you say so? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
21. How is your relationship with the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) 
regarding theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
22. What is the success rate regarding conviction of perpetrators for the theft of 
Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
23 Do you use an intelligence network to collect and gather information regarding 
theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
Yes  No  
 
 
24. What happens to individuals who are caught stealing? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
25. What do you do with the exhibit when found on the suspect? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Do you think that the stolen material/product (PGMs) is exported 
internationally? 
Yes  No  
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27. How is the material exported? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
28. Do you think that the criminals work alone or in groups? 
A. Alone Yes  No  
B. Groups Yes  No  
 
29. What are offenders’ demographic characteristics, such as age and gender? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Is there an ethnic component? 
Yes  No  
 
31. What is the modus operandi used in the theft of PGMs at Impala Platinum 
mines and refinery? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
32. Do you have any other information regarding theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION C (Security measures) 
 
33. What security measures are in place at Impala Platinum mines and refinery?  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
34. How would you rate the Security measures in place? 
Ineffective Yes No 
Effective Yes No 
Most effective Yes No 
 
35. To what extent do you agree with this statement? 
Effective Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
      
 
36. Is CCTV surveillance cameras in operation 24/7? 
Yes  No  
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37. Are the CCTV cameras monitored from a Control Room? 
Yes  No  
 
38. If yes, how many security officers do the monitoring? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
39. Are the Security Systems regularly maintained? 
Yes  No  
 
40. How often are the systems maintained? 
Daily   Weekly  Monthly   
 
41. Do you have Security Policies and Procedures in place? 
Yes  No  
 
42. If yes, are you and the employees familiar with the contents thereof? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
43. Do you have any Security Awareness programmes regarding crime in general? 
Yes  No  
 
44. If yes, how is this Awareness Programme promoted? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
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ANNEXURE D:  Questionnaire survey for security officers 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: SECURITY OFFICERS 
 
RESEARCH STUDY: A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): CASE STUDY OF 
IMPALA MINES AND REFINERY 
 
Instructions: 
Please answer all the questions. The information collected for this research study 
regarding prevention of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) will help the researcher to 
formulate effective and efficient security measures for the problems of theft encountered by 
Impala Platinum Mines and Refinery. You do not need to identify yourself and the 
researcher will ensure the response is treated with strict confidentiality and anonymity of 
participant is guaranteed. Please indicate with an ‘X’ in an appropriate box or write a 
response in the space provided. 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONS: 
SECTION A (Demographic Information) 
The following questions are for statistical purposes only: 
 
1. Gender Male  Female  
 
2. Age 18 – 30  30 – 50  More than 50  
 
  3.  Race 
Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
 
4. Marital Status 
Single  Married  Divorced  Widow / Widower  
 
5. How many dependants do you have? 
One  Two  Three  Four or more  
 
6. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Std 8 / Grade 10  Std 9 / Grade 11  Std 10 / Grade 12  
3 year Diploma / Degree  Postgraduate Degree  
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7. What is your current work position? 
Security officer  Junior Security officer  
 
8. How many years of work experience do you have? 
1 year  2 years  3-5 years  5-10 years  More than 10 years  
 
9. What courses have you attended? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION B (Crime Trends) 
 
10. What are the causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Do you think that the stolen material (PGMs) is exported? 
Yes  No  
 
12. What are the underlying reasons for the theft of PGMs? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Do you think criminals work alone or in groups? 
C. Alone Yes  No  
D. Groups Yes  No  
 
14. What are the offenders’ demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, 
etc.? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Is there an ethnic component? 
Yes  No  
 
16. What is the modus operandi used to commit theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
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17. Who do you think is involved in the theft of PGMs?  
A.  Employees Yes  No  
B. Contractors Yes  No  
C. Security officers Yes  No  
D. Other Yes  No  
 
18. If yes, why do you think so? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
19. What is the role of employees in the theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
20. What is your relationship with Security Investigators regarding theft of 
Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)? 
Good  Bad  Indifferent  
 
21. Do you have any important information regarding theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs)? 
Yes  No  
 
22. If yes, please provide such information. 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
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ANNEXURE E:  CONSENT FORM USED TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS 
 
AGREEMENT: 
 
I hereby consent to: 
 
 being interviewed on the topic “A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
FOR THE PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): 
CASE STUDY OF IMPALA PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY”; 
 follow-up interviews if necessary; 
 the interviews being recorded in writing or by using a tape recorder; 
 the use of data derived from these interviews by the interviewer in a research report as 
he deems appropriate. 
 
I also understand that: 
 
 I am free to end my involvement or to cancel my consent to participate in the research 
at any time should I want to; 
 Information rendered up to the point of my termination of participation could, however, 
still be used by the researcher; 
 Anonymity is guaranteed by the researcher and data will under no circumstances be 
reported in such a way as to reveal my identity; 
 I am free to determine that specific information that I reveal should not be recorded in 
writing; 
 No reimbursement will be made by the researcher for information rendered or for my 
participation in this project; 
 I will in no way derive any personal benefit from taking part in this research project; 
 By signing this agreement I undertake to give honest answers to reasonable questions 
and not to mislead the researcher; 
 I will receive the original copy of this agreement on signing it. 
 
I hereby acknowledge that the researcher/interviewer: 
 
 Discussed the aims and objectives of this research project with me; 
 Informed me about the contents of this agreement; 
 Explained the implications of my signing this agreement. 
 
In co-signing this agreement the researcher undertakes to: 
 
 Maintain confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy regarding the identity of the subject 
and information rendered by the interviewee. 
 
 
 ---------------------------------     -------------------------------  
 (Interviewee signature)    (Interviewer signature) 
 
 
_____________     _______________ 
(Date)       (Date) 
 
I, (interviewer signature) ___________________ certify that I explained the contents of the 
above document 
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ANNEXURE F:  INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS USED DURING 
INTERVIEWS 
 
1. This interviews purpose is to look into ways to prevent and detect theft by 
employees, contractors and security officers in this company. Do you 
understand? 
 
2. By theft we mean stealing company assets. Do you think theft of Platinum 
Group Metals (PGMs) is a problem in this company? 
 
3. What is your job title? 
 
4. What does your daily job entails? 
 
5. If employees, contractors or security officers are stealing from the company, 
why do you think they would do it? 
 
6. If you knew that an employee, a contractor or security officer were stealing from 
the company, what would you do? 
 
7. If an employee, contractor or security officer wanted to steal from the company, 
how would he or she do it and get away with it? 
 
8. Would you as an employee, contractors or security officer report any criminal 
activities you observed in your company? 
 
9. Do you think dishonest employees, contractors or security officer’s work 
together to steal from the company? 
 
10. In your opinion, why do they steal from the company? 
 
11. Do you ever think of stealing from the company if the opportunity arises? 
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12. Are the Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) easily accessible to be stolen by the 
criminals? 
13. In your opinion, do you think security measures in place are optimal and 
effective? 
 
14. Do you think SAPS members are also involved in the theft of PGMS? 
 
15. Have you ever witness another employee, contractor or security officer stealing 
from the company? 
 
16. In your opinion, when is this theft of PGMS committed? 
 
17. How do these criminals steal from the company? 
 
18. Do you know the employees, contractors or security officers who are involved 
in the theft of PGMS? 
 
19. What should the company do to prevent theft of PGMS? 
 
20. Do you think the company should make use of the polygraph before employing 
people? 
 
21. Do you have any other information regarding possible theft of PGMS in the 
company? 
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ANNEXURE G:  DOCKET ANALYSIS PRO FORMA SHEETS USED FOR DOCKET ANALYSIS 
 
1. DOCKET ANALYSIS 
 
IMPALA 
CASE 
NO. 
SAPS 
CASE 
NO. 
TIME DAY LOCATION TYPE OF 
PRODUCT 
VALUE 
OF 
PRODUCT 
NO. OF 
SUSPECTS 
EMPLOYEE / 
CONTRACTOR 
MODUS 
OPERANDI 
ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
2. INFORMATION RELATED TO ARRESTS, DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS AND CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OF SUSPECTS 
 
NAME ID 
NO. 
AGE SEX MARITAL 
STATUS 
LANGUAGE RESIDENTIAL 
ADDRESS 
DISCIPLINARY 
RESULT 
CRIMINAL 
COURT 
RESULT 
COMPANY ADDITIONAL 
SUSPECT 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
         
            
138 
©University of South Africa 2016 
ANNEXURE H: PERMISSION REQUEST LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
AT IMPALA PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY 
 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME  
DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW  
Prof. A. de V. Minnaar  
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 9530 Cell: 0838949485  
Fax2email: 0865190625 e-mail: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za 
F1-22 Brooklyn House, Veale St 
Muckleneuk Campus 
Preller St 
Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria 
PO Box 392 
UNISA 0003 
City of Tshwane 
Gauteng, South Africa 
 
Group Protection Services Manager, 
Impala Platinum 
P.O. Box 222 
Springs 1560 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE A RESEARCH STUDY AT YOUR 
ORGANISATION 
 
Mr Seadimo Joseph Mokhuane is currently a registered student busy with his research 
studies for a Master’s Degree (MTech) at the University of South Africa (UNISA) Pretoria in 
the Department of Criminology & Security Science. His research title is “A SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO THE PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP 
METALS (PGMs): CASE STUDY OF IMPALA PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY”. 
 
The primary purpose of the research study includes the following: 
 
 To identify possible weaknesses in security measures at Impala Platinum Mines and 
Refinery; 
 To investigate the root causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the modus operandi of perpetrators; 
 To determine the involvement of employees and contractors (if any) in the theft of 
Platinum Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the involvement (if any) of security officers in the theft of Platinum 
Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the role played by organised crime syndicates outside Impala; 
 Based on the research results, recommendations regarding a holistic approach in the 
implementation of effective and efficient security measures will be formulated and 
submitted to Impala Platinum mines and refinery to improve the security measures. 
 
Since theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) is a challenge encountered by the mining 
industry of South Africa, three questionnaires have been developed, one for detectives, one 
for security investigators and one for security managers. 
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Accordingly we would like to request permission for Mr Mokhuane to undertake and 
administer the questionnaires or examine case dockets with a sample of, or selected 
members of your company/organisation/department. The completed questionnaires will be 
collected by the researcher personally. 
 
Once permission is granted, the researcher would then be in contact with you or a 
representative of your company/organisation/department for the scheduling of any 
examining of case dockets or administering of the research questionnaires for the survey 
with the relevant employees in the company/organisation/department. 
 
The researcher will personally administer the questionnaires. The researcher will take into 
account all relevant ethical considerations, especially in relation to the freedom from physical 
or psychological harm; disclosure about the nature of the research; and privacy. 
 
The research information will play an imperative role in the decisions taken and affecting 
mining industry. Your company’s participation in the research study would therefore 
immeasurably add to the above research, since the wider the participation, the more 
enriched the collected data would be.  
 
Please note that respondents are not required to identify themselves in the questionnaires. 
The researcher will ensure that all responses are treated with strict confidentiality and the 
anonymity of the participants is guaranteed. 
 
Attached, for your information, is the approved research proposal, and the questionnaires for 
the survey to be administered to a sample of, or persons from Impala Platinum, inter alia 
from your company/organisation/department. 
 
Thanking you in advance, 
 (Prof.) 
AdeV Minnaar 
Programme Head: Security Management 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law 
UNISA 
 Mr 
Joseph Mokhuane 
MTech Student, Programme: Security Management 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law UNISA 
Student Number: 3773-03-04 
Tel: (011)3603358, Cell: 0828832568 
 
Date: ______________ 
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ANNEXURE I:  APPROVAL LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT IMPALA 
PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY 
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ANNEXURE J:  COVER LETTER FOR SECURITY MANAGERS  
 
Covering Letter for Security Managers’ questionnaire survey 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
A Security Risk Management approach to the prevention of theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs): Case study of Impala Platinum Mines and the Refinery. 
 
I am currently a student busy with my research studies for a Master’s Degree at the 
University of South Africa (UNISA) titled “A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
TO THE PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): CASE 
STUDY OF IMPALA PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY”. These studies are part of a 
series of research projects being implemented by the Department of Security Management 
at UNISA. 
 
Please find attached a questionnaire on Prevention of Theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs) which deals with issues regarding the main causes of theft and the impact in the 
mining industry and government. 
 
If any verification is required please contact the Programme Head Security Management, 
Prof. Anthony Minnaar (Department of Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law at UNISA, Tel: (012)4292160 or Cell: 0838949485, e-mail: 
aminnaar@unisa.ac.za). 
 
The primary purpose of this research study is as follows: 
 To identify weaknesses in security measures; 
 To investigate the root causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To look at the modus operandi of perpetrators; 
 To determine the involvement of security officers in the theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the roles of employees and security officers towards security 
measures; 
 To determine, Organised Crime syndicates operating outside mining industry; 
 
You are kindly requested to complete the questions in the attached questionnaire and return 
the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope supplied. You are not required 
to provide your name or any other identification. All information will be treated with 
confidentially and respondents will remain anonymous. When the final report is completed, it 
will be made available to all interested persons. 
 (Mr) 
SJ MOKHUANE 
Tel: (011)3603358, Fax: (011)3603359 or Cell: 0828832568 
 
 
142 
©University of South Africa 2016 
ANNEXURE K:  COVER LETTER FOR SECURITY INVESTIGATORS  
 
Covering letter for security investigators’ questionnaire survey 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
A Security Risk Management approach to the prevention of theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs): Case study of Impala Platinum Mines and the Refinery. 
 
I am currently a post graduate student busy with my research studies for a Master’s Degree 
at the University of South Africa (UNISA) titled “A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH TO THE PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): 
CASE STUDY OF IMPALA PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY”. These studies are part of 
a series of research projects being implemented by the Department of Security Management 
at UNISA. 
 
Please find attached a questionnaire on Prevention of Theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs) which deals with issues regarding the main causes of theft and the impact in the 
mining industry and government. 
 
If any verification is required please contact the Programme Head Security Management, 
Prof. Anthony Minnaar (Department of Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law at UNISA, Tel: (012)4292160 or Cell: 0838949485, e-mail: 
aminnaar@unisa.ac.za). 
 
The primary purpose of this research study is as follows: 
 To identify weaknesses in security measures; 
 To investigate the root causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To look at the modus operandi of perpetrators; 
 To determine the involvement of employees and contractors in the theft of Platinum 
Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the involvement of security officers in the theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the roles of employees and security officers towards security 
measures; 
 To determine organised crime syndicates operating outside mining industry; 
 
You are kindly requested to complete the questions in the attached questionnaire and return 
the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope supplied. You are not required 
to provide your name or any other identification. All information will be treated with 
confidentially and respondents will remain anonymous. When the final report is completed, it 
will be made available to all interested persons. 
 
 (Mr) 
SJ MOKHUANE 
Tel: (011)3603358, Fax: (011)3603359 or Cell: 0828832568 
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ANNEXURE L:  COVER LETTER FOR SECURITY OFFICERS  
 
Covering letter for security officers’ questionnaire survey 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
A security risk management approach to the prevention of theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs): Case study of Impala Platinum mines and the refinery. 
 
I am currently a post graduate student busy with my research studies for a Master’s Degree 
at the University of South Africa (UNISA) titled “A SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH TO THE PREVENTION OF THEFT OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMs): 
CASE STUDY OF IMPALA PLATINUM MINES AND REFINERY”. These studies are part of 
a series of research projects being implemented by the Department of Security Management 
at UNISA. 
 
Please find attached a questionnaire on Prevention of Theft of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs) which deals with issues regarding the main causes of theft and the impact in the 
mining industry and government. 
 
If any verification is required please contact the Programme Head, Security Management, 
Prof. Anthony Minnaar (Department of Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law at UNISA, Tel: (012)4292160 or Cell: 0838949485, e-mail: 
aminnaar@unisa.ac.za). 
 
The primary purpose of this research study is as follows: 
 To identify weaknesses in security measures; 
 To investigate the root causes of theft of Platinum Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To look at the modus operandi of perpetrators; 
 To determine the involvement of employees and contractors in the theft of Platinum 
Group Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the involvement of security officers in the theft of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs); 
 To determine the roles of employees and security officers towards security 
measures; 
 To determine organised crime syndicates operating outside mining industry; 
 
You are kindly requested to complete the questions in the attached questionnaire and return 
the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope supplied. You are not required 
to provide your name or any other identification. All information will be treated with 
confidentially and respondents will remain anonymous. When the final report is completed, it 
will be made available to all interested persons. 
 (Mr) 
SJ MOKHUANE 
Tel: (011)3603358, Fax: (011)3603359 or Cell: 0828832568 
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ANNEXURE M:  LANGUAGE EDITING CERTIFICATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: 31/07/2016  
Client: Joseph Mokhuane 
 
 
I, Dr David Barraclough - an academic editor of more than 25 years standing - did a 
language edit of a thesis by Joseph Mokhuane, in July 2015. 
 
The thesis included five separate chapters. Editing was done with Word track changes 
turned on and 29 comments and queries were made there to improve the text further. 
 
My amendments related mainly to grammatical and other linguistic aspects, in order to  
improve the clarity and readability of the document. Significant and varied changes 
were  
made. 
 
Please note that we operate under a strict code of academic ethics and do not rewrite  
academic content. Such text should be in the author's own words and, if an English 
Second Language speaker, may reflect this. 
 
This should not impact on academic outcomes for the candidate concerned, as it is just 
a matter of style. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
 
[signed] 
 
Dr D.A. Barraclough 
Full Member: South African Professional Editor's Guild (PEG), and of the South African 
Translators Institute (SATI) 
12A Alfred St, Observatory 7925; cell 082-0766862; fax 086-2186461; 
david.barraclough@copy-writing.co.za 
www.copy-writing.co.za 
 
